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In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins declared that 
sex stereotyping was a prohibited form of sex discrimination at work. This seemingly 
simple declaration has been the most important development in sex discrimination 
jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII. It has been used to extend Title VII’s 
coverage and to protect groups that were previously excluded. Astonishingly, 
however, the contours, dimensions, and requirements of the prohibition have never 
been clearly articulated by courts or scholars. In this paper I evaluate and reject the 
interpretations most often offered by scholars—namely that the prohibition requires 
either freedom of gender expression or sex-blind neutrality. I argue that the 
prohibition reflects not a coherent antidiscrimination principle but a pragmatic 
burden-shifting framework that turns on the compliance costs for the worker. I 
conclude by arguing that the sex stereotyping prohibition has not lived up to its 
rhetorical promise. Indeed, the implications of the prohibition are both dangerous 
and ironic in ways that scholars have yet to recognize. While the prohibition has 
extended Title VII’s protection to new classes of workers, it has done so by relying on 
and reinforcing traditional gender categories. The result is that the prohibition 
protects some individuals at the expense of the class whose subordination—
stemming from socially salient gender norms—remains intact.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins1 declared that 
sex stereotyping was a prohibited form of sex discrimination at work.2 This 
seemingly simple declaration has been the most important development in 
sex discrimination jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII.3 It has 
been the tool used to protect effeminate men and masculine women from 
harassment in the workplace.4 More recently, it has been the catalyst for a 
sea change in courts’ treatment of transsexuals.5 Transsexuals have gone 
 
1 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
2 In fact, the Supreme Court had condemned sex stereotyping since the 1970s. However, the 
sex stereotyping at issue in the cases preceding Price Waterhouse involved ascriptive sex stereo-
typing, whereby women were excluded from certain opportunities because they were presumed to 
have certain traits and attributes that rendered them unfit. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (striking down a federal statute that provided dependent benefits for all spouses 
of male service members, but provided the same benefits to the spouses of female service members 
only upon their showing of actual dependence on their wives for over one-half of their support, 
because it was based on an assumption that women do not support their husbands); Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1971) (striking down an employer’s no-marriage rule, 
which applied only to female flight personnel, because it was based on sex stereotypes about 
women’s domestic role). In Price Waterhouse, by contrast, the Court took aim at prescriptive sex 
stereotyping, whereby a woman was penalized because she did not, in fact, possess the traits and 
attributes expected of her sex. For a more extensive discussion of different types of sex stereotyping, 
see infra Part I. See also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 36-41 (1995) (explaining 
that the stereotyping “that applied to Hopkins was prescriptive—it centered on how she ought to 
behave”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, The Antidiscrimination Paradox: Why Sex Before Race?, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2010) (“Prescriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer insists that an 
individual possess or exhibit certain traits and attributes because of her group membership.”).  
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 21-43.  
5 Transsexualism was first listed as a condition in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders published in 1980. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261-64 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. 
The DSM-III identified the features of transsexualism as “a persistent sense of discomfort and 
inappropriateness about one’s anatomic sex” accompanied by a “persistent wish to be rid of one’s  
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from being outside antidiscrimination protection altogether,6 to being at the 
forefront of courts’ evolving and expanding interpretation of federal sex 
discrimination law.7  
Astonishingly, the precise contours, dimensions, and requirements of 
the sex stereotyping prohibition have never been articulated clearly either 
by courts or by scholars. Courts tend simply to restate the language of Price 
Waterhouse as though its meaning were self-evident.8 Scholars most often 
 
genitals and to live as a member of the other sex.” Id. at 261-62. The fourth edition of the DSM, 
published in 2000, replaced the term “transsexualism” with “Gender Identity Disorder (GID),” but 
the basic diagnostic criteria remained the same. A diagnosis of GID required “strong and 
persistent cross-gender identification” and “persistent discomfort” about one’s assigned sex or a 
“sense of inappropriateness in the gender role.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532, 537-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-
IV]. The revised edition of the DSM-IV, the DSM-IV-TR, published in 2004, retained the same 
diagnostic criteria. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 576, 581 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. For an explanation 
of how the term “transsexual” differs from the term “transgender,” see Anna Kirkland, Victorious 
Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2 
(2003) (“[T]he term transsexual . . . refer[s] to people who identify as such and who seek to alter 
their physiological gender status through surgery or hormones in order to bring it into line with 
their social and emotional gender status. The term transgendered . . . captures a broader category 
of gender variant people who have not necessarily sought to alter their bodies but nonetheless feel 
a disjunction between their biologically and socially gendered selves.” (emphasis omitted)).  
6 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-87 (7th Cir. 1984) (determining that 
Title VII’s legislative history indicates that it does not protect transsexuals); Sommers v. Budget 
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“Because Congress has not shown an 
intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on one’s transexualism does 
not fall within the protective purview of [Title VII].”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 
F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977), (refusing to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals because 
“Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ [in Title VII] to its 
traditional meaning”). 
7 See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Price 
Waterhouse extends Title VII protection to sex-stereotyped transsexuals); Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is transsexual . . . is no 
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-
stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”). 
8 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)  
(explaining that after Price Waterhouse, “in establishing that ‘gender played a motivating part in an 
employment decision’, a plaintiff in a Title VII case may introduce evidence that the employment 
decision was made in part because of a sex stereotype” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989))); Barnes, 401 F.3d at 741 (explaining that “[a] claim for sex discrimination 
under Title VII . . . can properly lie where the claim is based on ‘sexual stereotypes’”); Smith, 378 
F.3d at 571 (explaining that Price Waterhouse “held that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination 
‘because of . . . sex’ bars gender discrimination, including discrimination based on sex stereo-
types”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[J]ust 
as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did 
not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other 
men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.” 
(citation omitted)); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme  
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presume what the prohibition should mean,9 sometimes then chastising 
courts for their failure to apply the prohibition “correctly.”10 
In this paper, I take a position of greater deference to the judiciary with 
the aim of achieving greater clarity. By looking at recent case law invoking 
or ignoring the Supreme Court’s admonition of sex stereotyping, I seek to 
uncover the demands—and limits—of the prohibition as it is actually being 
applied, rather than as it should be applied in some normatively ideal 
jurisprudential universe. After defining the prohibition, I explore its likely 
implications for antidiscrimination law, workplace freedom, and social 
conceptions of gender.  
I begin in Part I with an introduction to the sex stereotyping prohibition 
announced in Price Waterhouse and its more recent jurisprudential progeny. 
In Parts II and III, I consider the interpretations of the prohibition most 
often offered by scholars—namely that the prohibition requires either 
 
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins makes clear that Title VII does not permit an 
employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to 
stereotypical gender roles.” (citation omitted)), vacated, 532 U.S. 1001 (1998).  
A few courts have, however, noted the ambiguity of the prohibition. Indeed, when Price Water- 
house came before the D.C. Circuit, Judge Williams dissented from the majority’s holding that the 
employer had engaged in prohibited sex stereotyping on the grounds that “[t]he majority 
implicitly adopts a novel theory of liability under Title VII, but neither confronts the novelty of 
the theory nor gives it any intelligible bounds.” Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams, J., dissenting), rev’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See also Schroer v. 
Billington (Schroer I), 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2006) (identifying the lack of 
consensus among lower courts on the meaning of the “Price Waterhouse approach to sex stereotyping,” 
and explaining that the prohibition was actually “considerably more narrow than its sweeping 
language suggests”). 
9 See, e.g., Case, supra note 2, at 37 (explaining that the sex stereotyping prohibition stated in 
Price Waterhouse protected individuals from being “penalized because their gender behavior did 
not conform to stereotypical expectations”); Andrew Gilden, Toward A More Transformative 
Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 92 
(2008) (“Under [the sex stereotyping] theory it is impermissible for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee for failure to conform to the stereotypes attached to his or her biological 
sex.”); Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law’s Categories: Anti-Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 62 (2003) (explaining that after Price Waterhouse, “[d]iscrimination 
because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII” 
(quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000))); Franklin H. Romeo, 
Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 740 (2005) (“Sex-stereotyping claims allege discrimination on the basis of 
a person's failure to conform to the expected behavior of their sex.”). 
10 See, e.g., Case, supra note 2, at 4 (“[S]hocking though it may be to some sensibilities, not 
only masculine women such as Hopkins, but also effeminate men, indeed even men in dresses, 
should already unequivocally be protected under existing law from discrimination on the basis of 
gender-role-transgressive behavior.”); Romeo, supra note 9, at 740-41 (“While the reasoning 
inherent in Hopkins would appear to cover discrimination against a wide spectrum of gender 
nonconforming people[,] . . . [c]ourts seemingly went out of their way to exclude transgender 
litigants from succeeding under claims of sex discrimination on these grounds.”). 
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gender libertarianism or trait neutrality. According to the gender-
libertarianism view, the sex stereotyping prohibition guarantees full freedom 
of gender expression in the workplace. According to the trait-neutrality 
view, the sex stereotyping prohibition requires that employees be permitted 
to adopt whatever gendered traits are permitted of the other sex. Both 
interpretations suggest the transformative potential of the prohibition; 
neither, I argue, is plausible. In Part IV, I consider whether the prohibition 
demands instead a narrower commitment to category neutrality whereby 
employers may require gender code compliance, but must remain neutral as 
to which gender code employees adopt. In Part V, I consider whether the 
sex stereotyping prohibition is best understood as a pragmatic burden-
shifting framework rather than as a distinct antidiscrimination principle. I 
argue that the burden-shifting framework—in which conformity demands 
viewed as highly costly by the court trigger a presumption of protection that 
the employer then bears the burden of overcoming—provides the most 
coherent and comprehensive account of the sex stereotyping prohibition at 
work. Finally, in Part VI, I examine the implications of the prohibition in 
light of Title VII’s broad antidiscrimination goals. Title VII operates on 
both an individual and a group level.11 Individuals are to be evaluated on 
their own merits rather than on their group membership.12 Traditional 
group hierarchies are to be dismantled, in part, by challenging the norms, 
stereotypes, and prejudices that justify and legitimize them.13 In practice, 
the sex stereotyping prohibition encourages plaintiffs to endorse and adopt 
highly stereotyped gender packages in order to convince courts of the steep 
costs associated with their forced gender expression. The implications of the 
 
11 See, e.g., John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
423, 474 (2002) (explaining that “[a]s clear as it is that the [Civil Rights] Act was intended as an 
anti-differentiation principle, it is equally clear that the purpose of the Act was to improve the 
economic condition” of protected groups). 
12 See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey) (“Title VII is 
designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion.”). 
13 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group . . . .”); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) 
(“It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ 
impressions about the characteristics of males or females.” (citation omitted)); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977) (noting that “the federal courts have agreed that it is 
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of 
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes”); see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of 
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”). 
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prohibition are both dangerous and ironic in ways that scholars have not 
previously recognized. While the prohibition has extended Title VII’s 
protection to workers who had previously been excluded, it has done so by 
relying on and reinforcing traditional gender categories. By doing so, 
moreover, the prohibition actually protects some individuals at the expense 
of the class whose subordination (stemming from socially salient gender 
norms) remains intact.  
I. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ITS PROGENY 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins involved a woman who was denied admit-
tance to the partnership at Price Waterhouse because she was deemed 
insufficiently feminine.14 Indeed, the partner who was responsible for 
informing her of the firm’s decision to put her candidacy on hold advised 
her that in order to improve her chances the following year, Hopkins should 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”15  
There is language in the case suggesting that what the Court found 
problematic about the employer’s femininity demands was that they placed 
Hopkins in a double-bind.16 Hopkins was required to be feminine, while the 
successful performance of her job required her to adopt more traditionally 
masculine traits and behaviors. As the Court explained, given the demands 
placed on her, Hopkins would be out of a job if she behaved aggressively, 
and out of a job if she did not.17  
 
14 490 U.S. at 235.  
15 Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (1985) (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
16 For similar readings, see Case, supra note 2, at 45, 60 (noting that “[t]he Hopkins plurality 
seems . . . . to have placed a great deal of weight on the doubleness of Hopkins's bind . . . . This 
raises the intriguing question of what would have happened had the double bind been dissolved.”). 
See also Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (“In our case, 
Dillon’s supposed activities or characteristics simply had no relevance to the workplace, and did 
not place him in a ‘Catch-22.’ Thus, the discussion of sexual stereotyping in Price Waterhouse does 
not support a holding that discrimination ‘on account of sex’ was involved in this case.”); Schroer I, 
424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.D.C. 2006) (surmising that what was problematic in Price Waterhouse 
was that the sex stereotyping at play “had created an intolerable ‘Catch-22’ for its female 
employees” (citation omitted)). 
17 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (1989) (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in 
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible 
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts 
women out of this bind.”).  
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Yet the Court’s rhetoric extended well beyond double-binds. Indeed, the 
Court declared all sex stereotyping to be a prohibited form of sex discrimina-
tion. It explained: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”18  
The Court’s prohibition actually encompassed two distinct types of sex 
stereotyping—ascriptive stereotyping and prescriptive stereotyping. 
Ascriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer assumes that an individual 
possesses certain traits and attributes because of her sex that render her 
unqualified for a particular position. This is the most traditional form of sex 
stereotyping, and was the Court’s initial target.19 Prescriptive stereotyping 
occurs when an employer insists that an individual possess or exhibit certain 
traits and attributes because of her group membership. Price Waterhouse 
involves prescriptive stereotyping.20 It was the Court’s novel and broad 
 
18 Id. at 251 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).  
19 Yuracko, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that “[a]scriptive sex stereotyping had been illegal 
well before Price Waterhouse”). Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. serves as an example of ascriptive 
stereotyping. See 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that an employer could not refuse to 
hire female, but not male, employees with young children based on the assumption that such 
workers would have heavy child care responsibilities). 
20 See J. Cindy Eson, In Praise of Macho Women: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 835, 851 (1992) (suggesting that the evaluation of Hopkins’s interpersonal skills drew on 
essentialized notions of gender as evidenced by her “deviation from the feminine stereotype,” and 
“the exaggerated perception of her ‘aggressive’ behavior by her male peers”); Joel Wm. Friedman, 
Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 211 (2007) (“Under what is now referred to as the sex-stereotyping 
principle, the [Price Waterhouse] Court declared that a plaintiff could demonstrate that she had 
been the victim of sex-based discrimination by establishing that the employer’s challenged action 
had been triggered by her failure to conform to its sex-stereotyped expectations.”); Jonathan A. 
Hardage, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. and the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit “Effeminacy” Discrimination?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 193, 202 (2002) 
(“[I]n Price Waterhouse, a majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court agreed that 
discrimination against an employee for failure to conform to gender stereotypes violates Title 
VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of . . . sex.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Bonnie H. Schwartz, Case Note, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 57 U.S.L.W. 4469 
(U.S. May 1, 1989) (No. 87-1167): Causation and Burdens of Proof in Title VII Mixed Motive Cases, 21 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 501, 539 (1989) (“Hopkins showed that stereotypes factored into the partnership 
selection process and that her failure to conform to them substantially motivated Price Waterhouse’s 
decision.”). Although far less common, it is possible to read Price Waterhouse itself as involving a 
kind of ascriptive stereotyping. It may have been that the partners were so flustered when 
Hopkins did not meet their expectations of proper femininity that they were unable to see that 
she could in fact do the job. 
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declaration against prescriptive sex stereotyping that set the stage for the 
dramatic expansion of courts’ protection of gender nonconformists under 
Title VII.  
The first significant development came in the use of the prohibition to 
protect men harassed because of their perceived effeminacy.21 In Doe v. City 
of Belleville, for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the harassment of 
two boys who were perceived by their male coworkers to be insufficiently 
masculine constituted sex discrimination.22 In concluding that the boys had 
presented evidence sufficient to show that they had been harassed because 
of sex, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s anti-sex stereo-
typing language from Price Waterhouse.23 The court explained: 
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his 
hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in 
a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and 
behave, is harassed “because of” his sex.24 
The Ninth Circuit provided similar protection to the plaintiff in Nichols 
v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.25 Antonio Sanchez worked as a host and 
then as a food server at Azteca restaurants in Washington State.26 During 
his four-year employment with the restaurant chain, Sanchez was the target of a 
steady stream of taunts and insults focusing on his perceived effeminacy.27 
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit held that Sanchez had 
 
21 Cases involving harassment of women perceived as inappropriately masculine are less 
frequent, but incorporated the sex stereotyping prohibition to similar effect. See, e.g., Heller v. 
Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1228-29 (D. Or. 2002) (denying the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence 
such that a jury could find she had been harassed because she was deemed inappropriately 
masculine in her traits and appearance). 
22 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). Belleville involved the harass-
ment of two teenage brothers working for the city as summer groundskeepers. Both brothers were 
subject to taunts and abuse by their male coworkers, but one of the brothers, H. Doe, was the 
“main target.” Id. at 567. The next year, the Supreme Court held in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc., that “same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.” 523 U.S. 75, 82 
(1998). The Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s Belleville opinion for further consideration in 
light of that decision.  523 U.S. at 1001.  Belleville settled before there was a decision on remand. 
Oncale did not undermine Price Waterhouse’s gender-stereotyping logic, upon which the Belleville 
Court relied in its decision. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (finding that “there is nothing in Oncale . . . that would call into question” the holding in 
Belleville that harassment based on a failure to live up to gender stereotypes is sex discrimination). 
23 Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580-82. 
24 Id. at 581. 
25 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
26 Id. at 870. 
27 Id. 
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suffered actionable sex discrimination.28 “At its essence,” the court 
explained, “the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that 
Sanchez did not act as a man should act. . . . Price Waterhouse sets a rule that 
bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes. That rule squarely 
applies to preclude the harassment here.”29 
More recent, and perhaps more dramatic, has been courts’ use of the 
prohibition to protect transsexuals from discrimination, beginning with the 
Sixth Circuit’s 2004 decision, Smith v. City of Salem.30 The court in Smith 
relied on the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping prohibition from Price 
Waterhouse to hold that a preoperative male-to-female transsexual had a 
cause of action31 for sex discrimination based on allegations that she32 was 
penalized for expressing feminine attributes at work.  
Jimmie Smith worked as a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department in 
Salem, Ohio.33 She was a biological male who had been diagnosed with 
Gender Identity Disorder (GID). Shortly after Smith began expressing a 
more feminine appearance at work, her coworkers started commenting on 
her appearance and claiming that her mannerisms “were not ‘masculine 
enough.’”34 After Smith told her supervisor about her GID and her intention 
to transition from male to female, the Chief of the Fire Department held a 
 
28 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the harassment was sufficiently severe to violate Title 
VII, that it was because of sex, and that the employer was liable for the harassment for failing to 
take adequate steps to stop it. Id. at 873, 874-75, 877-78. 
29 Id. at 874-75. Several other circuits have endorsed similar protection in principle. See, e.g., 
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
harassment aimed at punishing an employee for noncompliance with gender stereotypes is 
actionable discrimination because of sex, but concluding that the plaintiff “did not claim that he 
was harassed because he failed to comply with societal stereotypes of how men out to appear or 
behave”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that discrimination 
based on a failure to conform to sex stereotypes is actionable but holding that the plaintiff had 
failed to plead sufficient facts for the court to consider whether he was harassed because of his 
perceived effeminacy); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 
1999) (explaining that “just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated 
against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a 
claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped 
expectations of masculinity.” (citation omitted)). For an example of the protection courts have 
offered to female workers harassed for their perceived masculinity, see Heller v. Columbia 
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224, 1229 (D. Or. 2002).  
30 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).  
31 Id. at 578.  
32 In this and other cases involving transsexuals, I refer to the plaintiff using the plaintiff’s 
chosen pronoun as opposed to the pronoun chosen by the court.  
33 Id. at 568. 
34 Id. Smith’s transition to a more feminine self-presentation was “in accordance with inter-
national medical protocols for treating GID.” Id.  
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meeting to find a basis for terminating her employment.35 Smith sued, 
alleging that it was a form of sex discrimination to penalize her for her 
failure to conform to masculine stereotypes.36 The Sixth Circuit agreed and 
invoked the sex stereotyping prohibition to reverse the district court’s 
dismissal of her claims.37 As the court explained, “[s]ex stereotyping based on 
a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, 
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is 
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered 
discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”38 
One year later, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury finding of sex discrimi-
nation in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati.39 Philecia Barnes was a preoperative 
male-to-female transsexual who worked as a police officer in the Cincinnati 
Police Department.40 She presented evidence at trial showing that she was 
denied a promotion to the position of sergeant because she violated masculine 
stereotypes.41 The jury ruled in Barnes’s favor on her sex discrimination 
claim.42 Relying on its prior ruling in Smith for support, the court explained 
that a jury could have reasonably concluded that Barnes was discriminated 
against because of her failure to conform to masculine gender norms.43  
 
35 The court noted that the Chief of the Fire Department and the Law Director of the City 
of Salem “arranged a meeting of the City’s executive body to discuss Smith and devise a plan for 
terminating his employment.” Id. Shortly thereafter, Smith was suspended for one twenty-four 
hour shift due to an alleged infraction of department policy. Id. at 569.  
36 Id. at 572 (“[Smith’s] complaint sets forth the conduct and mannerisms which, he alleges, 
did not conform with his employers’ and co-workers’ sex stereotypes of how a man should look 
and behave.”).  
37 Id. (“Having alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man 
should look and behave was the driving force behind Defendants’ actions, Smith has sufficiently 
pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.”).  
38 Id. at 575. 
39 401 F.3d 729, 747 (6th Cir. 2005). 
40 Id. at 733.  
41 For example, during her probationary period, Barnes was told by a supervisor that she was 
not “sufficiently masculine.” Id. at 738.  
42 Id. at 735.  
43 Id. at 737-38. The Ninth Circuit has endorsed similar protection for transsexuals. See 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Gender Motivated 
Violence Act parallels Title VII in prohibiting victimization of a transsexual because “the victim 
was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one”); see also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 325 F. 
App’x. 492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[a]fter Hopkins and Schwenk, it is unlawful to 
discriminate against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in 
accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women,” but, nonetheless, holding that an 
employer’s ban on a transsexual plaintiff’s use of a women’s restroom for safety reasons did not 
constitute sex discrimination). 
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Several district courts in other circuits have recognized similar protections 
for transsexual workers.44 In Creed v. Family Express Corp., the plaintiff, a 
preoperative male-to-female transsexual, alleged that she was terminated 
after she began presenting a more feminine appearance at work and rejected 
her employer’s demand that she return to a more masculine appearance.45 In 
assessing the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim and denying the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, the court explicitly recognized sex stereotyping as the 
basis for such a claim.46 The court noted that “Ms. Creed’s allegation she 
was terminated after refusing to present herself in a masculine way permits 
the inference she was terminated as a result of [her employer’s] stereotypical 
perceptions, rather than simply her gender dysphoria.”47 As a result, the 
court concluded, “Ms. Creed’s factual allegations supporting her claim she 
was terminated because of her failure to comply with male stereotypes 
support a plausible claim she suffered discrimination because of her sex.”48  
 
44 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 663 
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff had shown a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause based on sex stereotyping and noting that “[t]his Court concurs with the majority of courts 
that have addressed this issue, finding that discrimination against a transgendered individual 
because of their failure to conform to gender stereotypes constitutes discrimination on the basis of 
sex”); Trevino v. Ctr. for Health Care Servs., No. 08-0140, 2008 WL 4449939, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 
Sept. 29, 2008) (determining that the plaintiff could state a claim for sex discrimination because 
she alleged discrimination under Title VII based on gender, not transsexualism); Lopez v. River 
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining that 
“Title VII is violated when an employer discriminates against any employee, transsexual or not, 
because he or she has failed to act or appear sufficiently masculine or feminine enough for an 
employer” (citation omitted)); see also Lie v. Sky Publ’g Corp., No. 013117, 2002 WL 31492397, at 
*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (“The plaintiff [a preoperative male-to-female transsexual] 
contends that the defendant’s conduct [requesting that the plaintiff wear only traditionally male 
attire at work and subsequently firing the plaintiff upon her refusal] was based on stereotyped 
notions of ‘appropriate’ male and female behavior in the same manner as the conduct of the 
defendant in Price Waterhouse. Accordingly, the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination . . . sufficient to survive summary judgment.”). 
45 No. 06-465, 2007 WL 2265630, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2007).  
46 Id. at *3 (“[A] transgender plaintiff can state a sex stereotyping claim if the claim is that he 
or she has been discriminated against because of a failure to act or appear masculine or feminine 
enough for an employer, but such a claim must actually arise from the employee’s appearance or 
conduct and the employer’s stereotypical perceptions.”). 
47 Id. at *4. The court explained: “From Ms. Creed’s allegations in the complaint, it can . . . 
reasonably be inferred that Family Express perceived Ms. Creed to be a man while she was 
employed as a sales associate. That her managers requested she appear more masculine during 
business hours allows the inference that the managers harbored certain stereotypical perceptions of 
how men should dress.” Id. 
48 Id. The court subsequently granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding 
that the plaintiff had not presented evidence sufficient to show that she was terminated because of 
her gender nonconformity, rather than her failure to satisfy the company’s sex-specific grooming 
codes. Id. at *3. Certainly, real tension exists in the district court’s opinion. It is unclear how the 
plaintiff, a transitioning male-to-female transsexual, could be protected from sex stereotypes while  
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In Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., the court likewise relied on sex 
stereotyping logic in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.49 The plaintiff, a preoperative male-to-
female transsexual, alleged that she was fired after she began to present as 
female in public.50 The court explained that “[h]aving included facts 
showing that [her] failure to conform to sex stereotypes of how a man 
should look and behave was the catalyst behind defendant’s actions, plaintiff 
has sufficiently pleaded claims of gender discrimination.”51 
More recently in Schroer v. Billington, the District Court for the District 
of Columbia held that the Library of Congress had engaged in sex discrimi-
nation by revoking its job offer to the plaintiff because she failed to satisfy 
stereotypes of what a woman should look like.52 The plaintiff, a male-to-
female transsexual, applied for and was offered a job as a terrorism specialist 
 
being punished for failing to satisfy her employer’s grooming code for men. As this tension 
suggests, the courts’ prohibition on sex stereotyping is complicated and nuanced in ways the courts 
themselves have not yet explicitly articulated.  
49 No. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006). 
50 Id. at *1. 
51 Id. at *2.  
52 (Schroer III), 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305-06 (D.D.C. 2008). Although the court ultimately 
relied on the sex stereotyping theory in ruling for the plaintiff, it struggled with the ambiguity of 
that theory in responding to the defendant’s first motion to dismiss. The court noted the judicial 
confusion surrounding the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping language in Price Waterhouse and 
explained that the prohibition was actually “considerably more narrow than [the opinion’s] 
sweeping language suggests.” Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209 (D.D.C. 2006) (ruling on the 
defendant’s first motion to dismiss). The court noted that cases involving discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and those involving sex-based dress codes “partake in some measure of sex 
stereotyping, and yet the courts deciding them . . . have not clearly articulated what, if anything, 
distinguishes any of the cases from Price Waterhouse.” Id. What was problematic in Price Waterhouse, 
the Schroer court surmised, was that the sex stereotyping at play “had created an intolerable 
‘Catch-22’ for its female employees.” Id. Indeed, in ruling on the defendant’s first motion to 
dismiss, the court concluded that Schroer had not stated a sex stereotyping claim of sex discrimi-
nation because Schroer was not being penalized for failing to satisfy conventional gender stereo-
types, but rather for seeking “to express her female identity . . . as a woman. . . . The problem she 
faces is not because she does not conform to the Library’s stereotypes about how men and women 
should look and behave—she adopts those norms.” Id. at 211. Nonetheless, the court denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Title VII should be understood to prohibit 
antitranssexual animus in addition to sex stereotyping. Id. at 212-13. After the court’s initial ruling, 
Schroer amended her complaint to allege that her “non-selection resulted from [her supervisor’s] 
reaction on seeing photographs of Schroer in women’s clothing—specifically, that [the supervisor] 
believed that Schroer looked ‘like a man in women’s clothing rather than what she believed a 
woman should look like.’” Schroer v. Billington (Schroer II), 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(ruling on the defendant’s second motion to dismiss). The amended complaint, the court 
concluded, did state a sex stereotyping claim because “Schroer now asserts that she was discriminated 
against because, when presenting herself as a woman, she did not conform to [her supervisor’s] sex 
stereotypical notions about women’s appearance and behavior.” Id. at 63. 
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with the Library of Congress while presenting herself as a man.53 Before 
beginning work, Schroer notified her new supervisor that she would begin 
work as a woman and showed her three photographs of herself dressed as a 
woman.54 Shortly thereafter, the supervisor withdrew the offer, admitting at 
trial that “when she viewed the photographs of Schroer in traditionally 
feminine attire . . . she saw a man in women’s clothing.”55 According to the 
court, this admission provided direct evidence that the Library’s decision 
“was infected by sex stereotypes.”56  
Neither the effeminate men nor the transsexual discrimination cases 
involve double-binds like the one at issue in Price Waterhouse. These are not 
cases in which the demands of masculinity conflict with actual job require-
ments. To the contrary, in cases like Smith and Barnes, masculine gender 
performances were likely to complement and even enhance job perfor-
mance. There must then be a broader conception of the sex stereotyping 
prohibition at work in these cases.  
II. LIBERTARIANISM 
The broadest reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition is that it is a 
demand for gender libertarianism in the workplace. Freedom from sex 
stereotypes, under this view, means freedom for workers from all forced 
gender conduct. All gender expressions—those that are group-identified as 
well as those that are idiosyncratic; those that are innate and fixed as well as 
those that are chosen and changing—are entitled to protection.  
Pointing to the expansiveness of courts’ stereotyping rhetoric, several 
scholars have adopted this broad reading of the prohibition. Thomas Ling, 
for example, asserts that Smith guarantees to all individuals the right “to 
 
53 Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06. 
54 Schroer III, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 
55 Id. at 305. 
56 Id. The Schroer III court found sex discrimination based both on its conclusion that the 
employer had engaged in sex stereotyping and because it concluded that that discrimination 
against a worker because of his plan to change his anatomical sex was “literally discrimination 
‘because of . . . sex.’” Id. at 308. The court explained:  
Ultimately, I do not think that it matters for purposes of Title VII liability whether 
the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived Schroer to be an 
insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently 
gender-nonconforming transsexual . . . . While I would therefore conclude that 
Schroer is entitled to judgment based on a Price Waterhouse-type claim for sex stereo-
typing, I also conclude that she is entitled to judgment based on the language of the 
statute itself. 
Id. at 305-06.  
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control their own gender expression.”57 Similarly, Johnny Lo contends that 
the Smith decision “preserve[s] liberty of self-identity in our 21st Century 
world.”58  
As a statement of current legal reality, such a reading of the prohibition 
is clearly fanciful. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court saw no problem 
with the masculine job demands placed on prospective partners. As Mary 
Anne Case has noted, “there is little indication . . . that the Court would 
have found it to be sex discrimination if a prospective accounting partner 
had instead been told to remove her makeup and jewelry and to go to asser-
tiveness training class instead of charm school.”59 Highly gendered workplace 
performances continue to be demanded in a wide range of jobs—think, for 
example, of the kind of gender performance typically required of elementary 
school teachers and litigators. Courts have done nothing to protect workers 
from such demands.60 Even more starkly antilibertarian is courts’ enforce-
ment of employers’ sex-based grooming codes. Consider, for example, the 
Ninth Circuit’s enforcement in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. of a 
requirement that female, but not male, bartenders wear makeup at work.61  
Yet even as a normative ideal, the libertarian reading of the prohibition 
is impractical and unappealing. At its most expansive, gender libertarianism 
requires protection for all forms of gender expression—those that are 
stereotypical, atypical, and idiosyncratic; those that are persistent; and those 
 
57 Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 285 (2005). 
58 Johnny Lo, Case Note, Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), 11 
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 277, 282 (2005). For additional expressions of this view 
see Amanda Raflo, Comment, Evolving Protections for Transgender Employees Under Title VII’s Sex 
Discrimination Prohibition: A New Era Where Gender is More Than Chromosomes, 2 CHARLOTTE L. 
REV. 217, 248 (2010) (stating that, after Smith, “it seems clear, or should be clear, that a 
transgender plaintiff would be protected under Title VII for failing to conform to traditional 
gender stereotypes of men and women under a Price Waterhouse theory”); William C. Sung, Note, 
Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, 
Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 537 (2011) (explaining that, after 
Smith, “discrimination or harassment based on . . . gender nonconforming behavior is impermissible 
irrespective of the cause of the behavior, whether it be gender expression or affectional prefer-
ences”); and Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title 
VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 562-63 (2007) (arguing that under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping 
theory “[d]iscrimination against someone for being transgender is discrimination based on that 
person’s non-conformity with gender stereotypes. This is true whether the individual is viewed by 
the employer or the court as a man who is insufficiently masculine, a woman who is insufficiently 
feminine, or someone who falls in between those seemingly binary categories”). 
59 Case, supra note 2, at 3.  
60 See generally Yuracko, supra note 2, at 15-16 (citing cases where courts deemed reasonable 
employers’ gender-normative workplace demands). 
61  444 F.3d 1104, 1107-08, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
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that are transient. Under this view, gender becomes whatever people say it 
is. As gender becomes solely a matter of self-identification, the distinction 
between gender and personal idiosyncrasy becomes one of mere nominalism, 
and all conduct becomes potentially entitled to protection.  
Title VII, however, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and 
gender,62 not discrimination based on a whole host of other traits and 
attributes.63 This distinction, to be meaningful, requires a definition of 
gender more stable than simple self-declaration. Yet, once gender is defined 
using external or objective criteria, there will be some forms of expression 
experienced by the actor as gender expressions that do not satisfy the 
category requirements.64 Protection for gender expressions will necessarily 
be limited to a proscribed set and some forms of “gender” expression will be 
defined out of the box. In particular, idiosyncratic or impermanent gender 
expressions are unlikely to be recognized and protected. Herein lies the core 
tension within the libertarian interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
stereotyping: complete gender freedom is incompatible with any kind of 
stable and workable definition of gender, but Title VII requires such a 
definition.  
 
62 See Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII prohibits 
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex or gender.”); Smith v. City 
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004) (asserting that Price Waterhouse “held that Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ bars gender discrimination”).  
63 See 110 CONG. REC. 7212-13 (1964) (interpretive memorandum of Title VII submitted by 
Sens. Clark and Case) (“To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment 
or favor and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited . . . are 
based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other 
criterion or qualification for employment is not affected by this title.”); see also Hill v. St. Louis 
Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[The ADEA and Title VII] serve the narrow purpose of 
prohibiting discrimination based on certain, discreet classifications such as age, gender, or race. 
These statutes do not prohibit employment decisions based upon poor job performance, erroneous 
evaluations, personal conflicts between employees, or even unsound business practices.”). 
64 External criteria for identifying gender expressions are necessary. Two seem most plau-
sible. Gender expressions might be defined by and limited to “standard” performances of 
masculinity or femininity. Gender would, in other words, be defined by those expressions that are 
socially group-identified. Alternatively, gender expressions might be limited to those that are 
deemed integral to one’s gender identity as determined not by self-proclamation but by an 
external judge or expert. Scholars have argued for versions of both approaches to identity in the race 
context. See, e.g., Juan F Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination 
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 833 (1994) (calling for revision of Title VII to make 
unlawful discrimination based on ethnicity, meaning “physical and cultural characteristics that 
make a social group distinctive, either in group members’ eyes or in the view of outsiders”); Gowri 
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, 
Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 19 (2006) (“[P]ersonal appearance choices play a unique 
and crucial role in the development and revision of a simultaneously public and personal 
identity . . . [and the] law can create a zone in which to better empower individuals to form and 
reform identity, promoting a dynamic, rather than static, culture and society.”).  
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To make this tension more vivid, consider the following. Imagine that 
instead of objecting to a requirement that she wear makeup at work, 
Darlene Jespersen objected to a requirement that she smile at customers. 
She objected not on the grounds that smiling violated her gender identity, 
but on the grounds that smiling inauthentically at strangers violated her 
self-image and sense of self.  
Jespersen’s challenge to the smile-at-customers rule would clearly fail 
under Title VII. Title VII does not provide blanket protection for personal 
expression, even for those forms of personal expression that are consistent 
with technical job requirements. Title VII is not a just-cause requirement; it 
does not protect against job-irrational treatment65—it only protects against 
treatment based on protected characteristics.66 
Imagine next that Jespersen objected to the smile-at-customers rule on 
the grounds that it violated her gender identity. Smiling at strangers, 
Jespersen might argue, is a particularly feminine attribute signaling deference 
and servility. It is in conflict with her more masculine and assertive gender 
identity.  
Under a libertarian interpretation of the sex stereotyping prohibition, 
Jespersen’s refusal to smile would now be protected under Title VII. So too, 
of course, would be any attribute that Jespersen labeled or identified as an 
expression of her gender.  
Without guidelines for what differentiates an expression of gender from 
an expression of personal taste, Title VII would be left without form, 
predictability, or limit. With gender guidelines in place, however, plaintiffs 
like my second hypothetical Jespersen will likely find their idiosyncratic 
expressions of gender unprotected. It is impossible to structure protection 
in a way that both relies on the category of gender and simultaneously 
transcends any conventional understanding of it.  
True gender libertarianism would also impose dramatic costs and con-
straints on both employers and society more generally. The most conven-
tional justification for Title VII’s prohibition on race and sex discrimination 
is that these are job-irrelevant hiring criteria.67 Race and sex per se are not 
relevant to (though they may be highly correlated with) whether one 
 
65 By “job-irrational,” I mean treatment that is not based on one’s ability or inability to do a 
particular job. An employer’s decision to refuse to hire anyone who shows up to an interview 
wearing green would, for example, be job-irrational and would not be prohibited by Title VII. 
66 See supra note 63. 
67 For a discussion of different definitions of the “antidiscrimination norm,” see Mark Kelman, 
Defining the Antidiscrimination Norm to Defend It, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2006). 
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possesses the range of skills and attributes necessary for (almost all) jobs.68 
Such is not the case with gender. Many jobs are distinctly gendered. That 
is, they demand a set of traits and attributes that are typically recognized as 
masculine or feminine. Prohibiting employers from requiring conduct that 
is traditionally gendered would force employers to restructure jobs so as to 
fit employees’ preferred gender expressions—such accommodations would 
be costly and, in some cases, impossible.  
Consider, for example, three jobs with traditionally feminine role 
demands—flight attendant, elementary school teacher, and paralegal. Flight 
attendants are (or at least were prior to 9/11) expected by employers to be 
warm, friendly, helpful, and at least somewhat deferential to customers.69 
Elementary school teachers are expected to be nurturing, empathetic, and 
sensitive to children’s needs.70 They are also expected to be collegial and 
cooperative in their dealings with other teachers and administrators.71 
Paralegals are expected to be organized and analytical. They are also 
expected to be deferential toward and emotionally supportive of the lawyers 
with whom they work.72  
These jobs differ significantly from those with traditionally masculine 
role demands such as litigation associate, debt collector, and Marine. 
Litigation lawyers are “expected to be tough, aggressive, and intimidating” 
toward their opponents.73 Debt collectors are expected, indeed encouraged, 
 
68 For instances in which sex is job-relevant, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and 
Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004). 
69 See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HUMAN FEELING 8 (1983) (“For the flight attendant, the smiles are a part of her work . . . .”); 
JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS 
52 (1995) (“[F]light attendants’ friendliness takes the form of deference: their relationship to 
passengers is supportive and subordinate.”). 
70 See JIM ALLAN, Male Elementary Teachers: Experiences and Perspectives, in DOING 
“WOMEN’S WORK”: MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 113, 123-26 (Christine L. William 
ed., 1993) (“For even as [male elementary teachers interviewed in the author’s study] were 
expected to be male role models, they were simultaneously stereotyped as feminine—because of 
the kind of work they do.”). 
71 See id. at 119 (“Since teaching on the elementary level requires a high degree of flexibility, 
collegiality, and cooperation, men who don’t ‘prove themselves,’ or don’t ‘get along,’ don’t get 
rehired.”). 
72 See Pierce, supra note 69, at 86 (describing the “emotional labor” paralegals undertake in 
supporting the attorneys with whom they work and characterizing such labor as “feminized”). 
73 Id. at 2. As Pierce describes, the lawyers in her study “boast about ‘destroying witnesses,’ 
‘playing hard-ball,’ and ‘taking no prisoners’ and about the size and amount of their ‘win.’” Id. at 60. 
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to be aggressive and intimidating toward debtors.74 Marines are celebrated 
for their “strength, aggressiveness, [and] emotional detachment.”75 
Certainly, some jobs seem gendered for no reason other than social 
convention. The role of secretary, for example, came to include both 
caretaking and sexual titillation only after the job became dominated by 
women.76 Such expectations were not part of the job when it was performed 
predominantly by men. As women came to dominate the profession, its 
norms changed so as to essentially preclude further male occupation.77  
Other jobs seem gendered for reasons more intrinsic to the job itself. 
Nurturing treatment, for example, probably is important to the healthy 
development of young children. A nurturing disposition may then be 
required of elementary school teachers for reasons independent of the fact 
that most elementary school teachers are female.78 The same may hold true 
of the role demands for Marines. The core functions of a Marine may simply 
be performed better by one who is physically strong, aggressive, and unemo-
tional. Men may dominate the Marines because they have these qualities to a 
higher degree than women, but the role demands themselves may be defined 
this way for reasons independent of men’s past or present dominance.  
Jobs may be gendered not only in terms of the attributes they seek, but 
also, in terms of the clothes and appearance they require. Construction and 
other forms of physical labor, for example, often require not just a kind of 
 
74 See Hochschild, supra note 69, at 1146 (describing that “open aggression was the official 
policy for wringing money out of debtors”). 
75 See CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN 
IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 1 (1989). 
76 See Rosemary Pringle, Male Secretaries, in DOING “WOMEN’S WORK”, supra note 70, at 
128, 132-33 (Christine L. Williams ed., 1993) (noting the emergence of a “sexual dynamic” in the 
relationship between secretaries and their bosses that “largely exclude[s] men from being defined 
as secretaries”); see also ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 
70 (1977) (“The secretarial job involved the most routine of tasks in the white-collar world, yet the 
most personal of relationships.”). 
77 Such preclusion was primarily by gender, the requirement of feminine deference weeding 
out the more traditionally masculine—and only to a lesser degree by sex, to the extent that sexual 
titillation was also being demanded. 
78 It certainly may be that the gendered aspects of the role are reaction qualifications rather 
than technical qualifications. See Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 
99, 100 (1983) (explaining that “[r]eaction qualifications refer to those abilities or characteristics 
which contribute to job effectiveness by causing or serving as the basis of the appropriate reaction 
in the recipients. Technical qualifications refer to all other qualifications (of an ordinary sort)”). It 
may be, in other words, that being soft of voice and touch is important for elementary school 
teachers only because of the positive response such treatment elicits from young subjects. Yet for 
teachers of young children, being able to elicit happy and positive student reactions may be the 
most important qualification for the job.  
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masculine strength, but also the adoption of masculine dress and grooming 
styles in order for these jobs to be performed safely. 
An employer who is unable to force a femininely gendered construction 
worker to tie her hair back and wear pants to work will be unable to safely 
assign the worker to a range of duties. An employer who is unable to force a 
femininely gendered bill collector to scowl and talk in an aggressive manner 
may have to pair the feminine worker with a more masculine coworker, in a 
good-cop/bad-cop kind of ploy, in order for the worker to be effective. An 
employer who cannot force a masculinely gendered elementary school 
worker to smile and coo at his charges may not be able to create the kind of 
warm and nurturing atmosphere in which children thrive. In all cases, the 
costs to employers, and society more generally, of true gender libertarianism 
for workers would be significant.  
Perhaps, however, there is a narrower libertarian principle at work in 
courts’ sex stereotyping jurisprudence. It may be that although not all 
gender expressions are protected, those gender expressions that are 
consistent with technical job requirements are entitled to protection. This 
narrower libertarian reading would lessen the costs imposed on employers 
by the broader principle, since employers would not be required to hire 
individuals whose gender expressions were incompatible with successful job 
performance. It would continue, however, to suffer from ambiguity about 
what constitutes an expression of “gender.”  
Although theoretically distinct, this narrower libertarian reading would 
be similar in its scope to a reading of the prohibition as requiring trait 
neutrality from employers. Under a trait-neutrality reading, an employer 
must permit female employees to express their gender in any ways permitted 
of male employees and vice versa. Presumably, all gender expressions an 
employer permits of either sex are compatible with job performance, 
otherwise the employer would not permit them for anyone. The narrow 
libertarian reading would, therefore, protect all gender expressions protected 
by the trait-neutrality reading, and potentially more.79 It follows that if the 
trait-neutrality reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition is implausibly 
expansive, then the narrow libertarian principle is implausible as well.  
 
79 The narrow libertarian principle could be broader than the trait-neutrality principle in 
instances where an employer rigidly restricts the gender expressions of both sexes such that there 
are some job-irrelevant gender expressions that would be protected under the narrow libertarian 
principle but that would not be protected under the trait-neutrality principle if consistently 
prohibited for both sexes by the employer.  
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III. TRAIT NEUTRALITY 
Under a trait-neutrality reading, the prohibition on sex stereotyping 
requires employers to be indifferent to whether gendered traits are adopted 
by women or by men. As a result, any gendered expression permitted of 
women must be permitted of men, and vice versa.  
 Both before and after the recent transsexual victories, trait neutrality 
has been a popular interpretation of the prohibition on sex stereotyping.80 
Mary Anne Case has endorsed this reading most clearly, explaining that 
under Price Waterhouse “[i]f their employer tolerates feminine behavior or 
attire in women but not in [men], the employer is subjecting them to 
disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.”81 Indeed, trait neutrality 
simply restates a conventional understanding of the sex discrimination 
prohibition that has been used in a range of contexts.82 It is a reading that 
extends beyond situations involving sex stereotypes and does not rely on 
them.  
Yet in a world of richly textured gender norms, demands of trait neu-
trality are more complex and indeterminate than often recognized. Gender 
norms give traits socially loaded meanings and these meanings make finding 
cross-sex comparators difficult if not impossible.  
Imagine, for example, a female librarian terminated from her job at a 
university library who claims that she was terminated because her employer 
found her manner of dress too “sexy.”83 She sues for sex discrimination 
arguing that she was the victim of a sex stereotype that deems women, but 
not men, who present themselves in a sexy manner to be professionally 
 
80 See Ling, supra note 57, at 285 (“Smith upturns rigid sex categories and allows both sexes to 
participate in the full range of gender expressions.”); Turner, supra note 58, at 590 (interpreting 
Smith to mean that “discrimination against a person for acting ‘like’ the other sex—no matter what 
the reason—is sex discrimination”). 
81 Case, supra note 2, at 7; see also Brief for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and Equal 
Rights Advocates as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, Lucas Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust 
Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 99-2309), reprinted in 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 170 
(2001) (interpreting the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping prohibition to mean that “for a man to 
be denied access to credit on the basis of traits that would have been welcome if found in a woman 
is sex discrimination, plain and simple”). 
82 Andrew Koppelman, for example, has argued that discrimination because of sexual orienta-
tion is sex discrimination because it penalizes women for doing something that men are permitted 
to do (namely partnering with women) and vice versa. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE 
GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 53-71 (2002); Andrew Koppel-
man, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 
(1994); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 
98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).  
83 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Harvard Univ., No. 03-11797, 2005 WL 2148515 (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 
2005); Harvard Librarian Sues University, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A13.  
  
2013] Soul of a Woman 777 
 
incompetent and unintellectual.84 To determine whether the employer is in 
fact violating the principle of trait neutrality, a court would need to compare 
the employer’s treatment of the plaintiff with its treatment of a man 
engaged in similarly gendered conduct. What is unclear, however, is what 
constitutes similarly gendered conduct in a man.  
There is no exact male equivalent to the female trait of “sexy dressing.” 
One could identify the trait at issue in a narrow and literal way. The trait 
might be described as wearing particular types of clothes—for instance, low-
cut blouses and tight skirts. By naming the trait in this way, the woman is 
the victim of discrimination if she is treated worse than a man who wore the 
same types of blouses and skirts to work. Framing the issue in this way, 
however, is unlikely to result in a finding of sex discrimination because of 
the likely absence of a cross-sex comparator.85 Yet even if such a comparator 
could be found, it is far from clear that this narrowly literalistic framing of 
the cross-sex comparison is appropriate. A man dressed in a low-cut blouse 
and tight skirt might be objectionable to the employer, but it is probably 
not because he is sexy.  
Alternatively, one could compare the woman’s treatment to that of a man 
dressed in sex-specific sexy clothing. Of course, deciding what constitutes 
sexy dressing for men is not obvious and probably open to disagreement.86 
Is the parallel to the sexy dressing woman in revealing skirts and blouses a 
man in revealing open-chested shirts and tight pants? Or, because of the 
significantly different social and symbolic meanings of women and men in 
revealing clothing, are tight and revealing clothes considered sexy in women 
but strange and nonsexy in men such that this too may not be an appropriate 
comparison? 
Finally, one could compare the employer’s treatment of women who 
dress in a sexy manner with its treatment of men who violate appropriate 
workplace norms. At this level of abstraction, however, the neutrality 
demand becomes toothless and unable to challenge employers’ endorsement 
of any gender stereotypes.  
 
84 See Peter Glick et al., Evaluations of Sexy Women in Low- and High-Status Jobs, 29 PSYCHOL. 
OF WOMEN Q. 389, 394 (2005) (finding that female managers who presented themselves in a sexier 
manner elicited “perceptions of less competence on a subjective rating scale and less intelligence on 
an objective scale” as compared with female managers who dressed more conservatively). 
85 For an outstanding discussion of the difficulties in finding comparators in antidiscrimina-
tion cases and a critique of courts’ reliance on comparator methodology, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011). 
86 I suspect there is significantly less social consensus regarding what constitutes sexy dressing 
for men than there is about what constitutes sexy dressing for women. 
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The indeterminacy problem is particularly apparent in cases involving 
transsexuals. Imagine a preoperative male-to-female transsexual who is 
terminated for wearing skirts and feminine blouses to work. Is the appro-
priate comparator for purposes of trait-neutrality analysis a woman wearing 
conventionally feminine clothes? Or, is the preoperative male-to-female 
transsexual better compared to a woman wearing conventionally male 
clothes, or to a female-to-male transsexual wearing male clothes?87 Gender 
norms complicate cross-sex comparisons and make trait-neutrality demands 
virtually impossible to operationalize.  
For the trait-neutrality requirement to be workable, gender norms must 
be ignored or rejected. Trait neutrality must be defined in a literal and 
formalistic way without regard to the actual social meaning of the traits and 
attributes at issue. To use Mary Anne Case’s colorful example, if women are 
free to wear “frilly pink dresses” at work, then men must be permitted to do 
so as well,88 despite the fact that a frilly pink dress signals conservatism in a 
woman and transgression in a man. For advocates of trait neutrality, such 
rejection or transcendence of gender norms may seem not only appealing, 
but the very point of the prohibition on sex stereotyping.  
Yet rejecting gender norms is costly. Gender norms are not only perva-
sive, they are also, often, comfortable and comforting. Formal trait neutrality 
would require that if female employees are permitted to wear dresses, long 
hair, and makeup, male employees must be permitted to do so as well. 
Certainly, some employers might follow this approach, thereby expanding 
the range of permissible traits and attributes open to employees of both 
sexes. For other employers, or their customers, the discomfort of such 
gender bending would be too great. For them, compliance might instead 
take the form of highly circumscribed gender codes confined to a banal 
androgynous core. Discomfort with gender bending would be minimized, but 
 
87 Several courts have struggled with the problem of appropriate cross-sex comparators in 
transsexual discrimination cases. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 WL 
31098541, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (“[T]his is not a situation where the plaintiff failed to 
conform to a gender stereotype. Plaintiff was not discharged because he did not act sufficiently 
masculine or because he exhibited traits normally valued in a female employee, but disparaged in a 
male employee. . . . The plaintiff was terminated because he is a man with a sexual or gender 
identity disorder who, in order to publicly disguise himself as a woman, wears women’s clothing, 
shoes, underwear, breast prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish, pretends to be a woman, and 
publicly identifies himself as a woman named ‘Donna.’”); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, 881 F. 
Supp. 478, 481 n.4 (D. Kan. 1995) (explaining that in order to evaluate a plaintiff’s sex discrimination 
claim, the court would have to compare the treatment of the plaintiff as a male-to-female 
transsexual with the treatment of a female-to-male transsexual). 
88 Case, supra note 2, at 7. 
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at the cost of a loss of freedom for gender conformists and nonconformists 
alike.89  
Perhaps not surprisingly, courts have not interpreted the sex stereo-
typing prohibition to require trait neutrality of this formalistic sort.90 After 
Price Waterhouse, as before, courts have routinely upheld sex-specific 
grooming codes such as those requiring that men but not women wear their 
hair short91 and those requiring that men but not women refrain from 
wearing earrings.92 Similarly, in Jespersen the court paid lip service to the 
 
89 For a more extensive discussion of the likely results of trait neutrality, see Kimberly A. 
Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 167, 198-204 (2004). 
90 Certainly the Sixth Circuit in Smith did use language suggesting a formalistic trait-
neutrality requirement of this sort. Yet, the broad language used in Smith, like that used by the 
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, is more accurately viewed as judicial rhetoric than legal 
reality. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (“After Price Waterhouse, an 
employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or 
makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the 
victim’s sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses 
and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”). 
91 See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
(holding that a male employee terminated for not complying with the employer’s hair-length 
requirement for men could not state a claim for sex discrimination); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 
549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming that “[e]mployer grooming codes requiring different 
hair lengths for men and women” are not a violation of Title VII); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, 
Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding hair-length regulation to not be a violation of 
Title VII, in part because hair length is not an immutable characteristic); Longo v. Carlisle 
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that “requiring short 
hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 527 F.2d 
1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that an employer’s grooming requirements did not constitute 
sex discrimination because the policies were “reasonable” and “evenhanded”); Willingham v. 
Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a male plaintiff’s 
allegation of dismissal on the basis of hair length was not sex discrimination as hair length is 
neither immutable nor a protected characteristic); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 
(9th Cir. 1974) (holding that an employer may impose standards of grooming on males that are 
inapplicable to females); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“We do 
not believe that Title VII was intended to invalidate grooming regulations which have no 
significant effect upon the employment opportunities afforded one sex in favor of the other.”). 
92 See, e.g., Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
31, 2000) (agreeing with other federal courts that a grooming code allowing female but not male 
employees to wear earrings did not violate Title VII); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, 
No. 86-1944, 1987 WL 9687, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (determining that an allegedly 
unwritten grooming code prohibiting men but not women from wearing earrings does not 
constitute sex discrimination); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa 2003) 
(“Personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant 
impact on employment opportunities do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of 
[Title VII].”); MacIssac v. Remington Hospitality, Inc., No. 03-1015, 2004 WL 1541807, at *2 
(Mass. App. Ct. July 9, 2004) (affirming a lower court judgment that enforcement of a grooming 
code prohibiting male but not female employees from wearing earrings did not constitute sex  
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prohibition on sex stereotyping, but did not interpret it to demand formal 
gender neutrality in any literal sense.93 Jespersen could be fired for not 
wearing makeup even though male employees were permitted—indeed 
required—to not wear makeup.94  
Reading the prohibition on sex stereotyping as a demand for trait 
neutrality may seem appealing because it maps easily onto conventional 
legal and social conceptions of nondiscrimination. Yet, to be workable in a 
society with rich gender norms, trait neutrality requires a kind of gender-
blind formalism. Such neutrality in practice would be culturally transforma-
tive, not conservative. It is this fact that perhaps best explains why courts 
have not applied the prohibition as a trait-neutrality requirement. 
IV. CATEGORY NEUTRALITY 
It may be that the sex stereotyping prohibition does not require trait 
neutrality but a narrower form of category neutrality. Under this reading, 
the prohibition on sex stereotyping requires that employers be neutral as to 
the gender category into which workers fall. Workers may be required to 
comply with the norms of one gender or the other, but workers may not be 
forced into the “wrong” gender box simply because of their biological sex.95  
Certainly there is much about the recent transsexual sex discrimination 
case law that is suggestive of, or at least consistent with, a reading of the sex 
stereotyping prohibition as requiring category neutrality. In Smith, for 
example, the plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual, began expressing a 
more feminine appearance at work and told his supervisor of his intention 
to transition completely to a fully feminine appearance.96 Similarly, in 
Barnes, the plaintiff was a male-to-female transsexual who lived as a woman 
off-duty and who began to adopt a more feminine appearance at work as 
well as part of her overall transition.97 In Schroer, the plaintiff was a male-to-
female transsexual who was offered a position while expressing a masculine 
 
discrimination); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
a grooming code prohibiting male but not female employees from wearing facial jewelry did not 
constitute sex discrimination).  
93 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
94 Id. at 1107. Indeed, it is likely that a man would have been fired for wearing makeup, as 
this was in violation of the “Personal Best” guidelines for men. 
95 For a reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition consistent with this approach, see 
Gilden, supra note 9, at 99. Gilden notes that “[w]hether an individual brings sex-stereotyping 
claims as either male or female, she is forced to make some claim of truth about who she really is 
within an unexamined binary biological framework.” Id. 
96 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).  
97 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2005).  
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gender identity and was subsequently denied the position when she told her 
supervisor that she would be expressing a feminine gender identity on the 
job.98 In all cases, the plaintiffs sought the right to express their “true” 
gender on the job despite its disconnect with their biological sex. None of 
the plaintiffs challenged gender categories per se, only their assignment 
between them. A requirement that employers be neutral as to the gender 
category into which workers fall can explain courts’ protection of such 
plaintiffs. 
The category-neutrality reading can also explain courts’ often heavy 
reliance in the transsexual cases on medical evidence regarding GID. Such 
evidence serves to substantiate the plaintiff’s “true” gender and to identify 
the appropriate gender code to which she may be subject at work. In Smith, 
for example, the court noted at the outset that Smith was “a transsexual and 
has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder . . . which the American 
Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an individual’s 
sexual organs and sexual identity.”99 The court went on to explain that 
when Smith “began expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time 
basis” she did so “in accordance with international medical protocols for 
treating GID.”100  
In Schroer, the court received expert testimony from a clinical social 
worker with expertise in gender identity issues who had been providing 
counseling to the plaintiff.101 The expert testified that Schroer had GID and 
that she “has a female gender identity and is a woman.”102 The result of 
such testimony was the court’s confident assertion that “Diane Schroer is a 
male-to-female transsexual. Although born male, Schroer has a female 
gender identity—an internal, psychological sense of herself as a woman.”103  
Similarly, in Doe v. Yunits, a case involving a claim of sex discrimination 
in education, rather than employment, the court referenced testimony from 
 
98 Schroer III, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295-99 (D.D.C. 2008).  
99 Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.  
100 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
101 Expert Report of Martha L. Harris, LCSW at para. 22(b), Schroer I, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 
(D.D.C. 2006) (No. 05-01090), 2006 WL 4517048 [hereinafter Harris Report].  
102 Id. at para. 22(a). The Schroer court also received more general testimony from two other 
experts. Walter Bockting, a clinical psychologist, served as a second expert for the plaintiff and 
provided general background information about gender identity and the diagnosis and treatment 
of Gender Identity Disorder. Expert Report of Walter O. Bockting, PhD at paras. 13-32, Schroer I, 
424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (No. 05-01090), 2006 WL 4517046 [hereinafter Bockting Report]. Chester 
Schmidt, a psychiatrist, served as an expert for the defendant. He emphasized the distinction 
between one’s sex and one’s gender role. He also testified that the causes of Gender Identity 
Disorder were not known. Expert Report of Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., MD at paras. 5-8, Schroer I, 
424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (No. 05-01090), 2006 WL 4517051.  
103 Schroer III, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295.  
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Doe’s treating psychologist, a professor of social work with expertise on 
transgendered children, in assessing Doe’s likelihood of success on the 
merits of her sex discrimination claim.104 Doe was a fifteen-year-old student 
who, although biologically male, began wearing “girls’ make-up, shirts, and 
fashion accessories to school.”105 When she arrived at school in girls’ apparel, 
the principal would often send her home to change.106 The following year, the 
principal instructed Doe, then an eighth grader, to come by his office every 
day so that he could approve her appearance. The principal would send Doe 
home when he found her appearance to be too feminine.107 At the start of 
the following year, when Doe was to repeat eighth grade due to her many 
absences, the principal told Doe that she “would not be permitted to enroll 
if she wore any girls’ clothing or accessories.”108 Doe sued for sex discrimi-
nation under the Massachusetts Constitution and also filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction.109  
Relying on the testimony of Doe’s therapist, the court explained that 
she had been “diagnosed with gender identity disorder, which means that, 
although plaintiff was born biologically male, she has a female gender 
identity.”110 In light of such medical evidence, the court explained that the 
“right question” in assessing Doe’s sex discrimination claim was “whether a 
female student would be disciplined for wearing items of clothes plaintiff 
chooses to wear.”111 The court concluded that the “[p]laintiff is likely to 
establish that defendants have discriminated against her on the basis of sex 
by applying the dress code against her in a manner in which it would not be 
applied to female students.”112 In other words, the school could force Doe to 
comply with a sex-specific gender code, but it could not force her into the 
 
104 No. 00-1060-A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff’d sub nom. 
Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).  
105 Id. at *1.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. at *2. 
109 In interpreting the sex discrimination provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, the 
Massachusetts Superior Court found “persuasive” the plaintiff’s reliance on the sex stereotyping 
prohibition articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Id. at *6. In response to the plaintiff’s 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the court found that Doe had shown a likelihood of success on 
her sex discrimination claim. Id. at *7.  
In addition to the sex discrimination claim, Doe also brought state law claims alleging a denial 
of freedom of expression, disability discrimination, denial of liberty interest in appearance, denial 
of due process, and denial of the right to personal dress and appearance. Id. at *2.  
110 Id. at *1.  
111 Id. at *6. 
112 Id. at *6 n.6. 
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wrong gender category. Medical evidence was critical to determining the 
right category.  
Finally, the category-neutrality reading can help explain why courts 
have been using the sex stereotyping prohibition to protect transsexual 
workers from sex-based dress and grooming codes while denying similar 
protection to nontranssexual workers.  
Compare, for example, the results in Smith and Doe with those in Jesper-
sen and Youngblood v. School Board of Hillsborough County,113 a case with facts 
similar to those in Doe.  
In both Smith and Doe, the plaintiffs claimed that they were really women 
trapped in men’s bodies. They argued that they were being forced into the 
wrong gender category as a result of their biological sex. The courts in both 
cases found such allegations to state actionable claims of sex discrimination. 
In contrast, Jespersen could not and did not argue that she had GID or 
that she was really a man trapped in a woman’s body. She did not disavow 
her female gender completely, but instead objected to particular gender 
conventions.114 As the Ninth Circuit stressed, Jespersen objected to the 
makeup requirement because “wearing it would conflict with her self 
image.”115 Jespersen was not being forced into the wrong gender box; she 
was merely being forced to comply more fully with the demands associated 
with the gender to which she ascribed. In other words, although Jespersen 
was being sex stereotyped in a colloquial sense, she was not being miscatego-
rized. She was, of course, denied antidiscrimination protection.116 
Consider as well the case of Youngblood v. School Board of Hillsborough 
County.117 Nikki Youngblood was a seventeen-year-old high school senior in 
Hillsborough County, Florida who objected to wearing a scoop neck drape 
for her senior yearbook picture.118 Youngblood wore a shirt and tie to her 
senior photo and was told that the school’s dress code for the yearbook 
photos required that all girls wear a “velvetlike, scoop-neck drape.”119 
Youngblood refused to wear the drape and the school left her picture out of 
 
113  No. 02-1089-24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2002) (order granting motion to dismiss). 
114 Jespersen did not object to Harrah’s other gendered appearance requirements. Female 
employees were, for example, required to have their hair “teased, curled, or styled every day” 
while male employees were simply prohibited from having hair “extend below top of shirt collar.” 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
115 Id. at 1108. Jespersen also stated that the makeup requirement undermined her “self-
dignity.” Id. 
116 Id. at 1113. 
117 Youngblood, No. 02-1089-24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2002) (order granting motion to dismiss). 
118 See id. at 1; see also Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms under the Transgender Umbrella, in 
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 7 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).  
119 See Currah, supra note 115.  
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the yearbook.120 Youngblood sued for sex discrimination and lost. Indeed, 
the court held that she was not even able to state a claim.121  
As in Jespersen, and unlike in Smith and Doe, Youngblood’s lawyers could 
not, and did not try to, convince the judge that Youngblood’s gender was 
actually male. Youngblood’s attorneys could not rely on a diagnosis of GID. 
Instead, they could only “describe [Youngblood’s] aversion to feminine 
clothing as ‘deepseated’ and ‘longlasting.’”122 Yet, for the court, such 
testimony—unsupported as it was by medical evidence or clear diagnosis—
was insufficient to establish any legal right.123  
A category-neutrality reading cannot, however, make sense of the full 
range of cases implicating the sex stereotyping prohibition. The reading can 
explain why courts deny protection to nontranssexuals who violate sex-
specific grooming codes, but it cannot explain why courts have used the sex 
stereotyping prohibition to protect effeminate men (and masculine women) 
from harassment. Like the plaintiffs who challenge discrete sex-specific 
grooming codes, the plaintiffs in these cases are not seeking to switch 
gender categories. Consider, for example, the plaintiffs in Doe v. City of 
Belleville,124 Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,125 and Rene v. MGM 
Grand Hotel, Inc.126 In Doe, the plaintiffs were two sixteen-year-old brothers 
who were taunted because their older male coworkers perceived them to be 
effeminate.127 In Nichols, the plaintiff was a man whose male coworkers 
referred to him using female pronouns and mocked him for walking and 
carrying his serving tray “like a woman.”128 Similarly, in Rene, the plaintiff 
 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 11 (“Ruling on the school board’s motion to dismiss the case, the federal district 
court judge in Youngblood’s case . . . found ‘no constitutionally protected right for a female to 
wear a shirt and tie for senior portraits.’”).  
122 Id. at 10 (quoting plaintiff’s Appeal of a Final Order of the District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida at 2-3, Youngblood v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 02-15924 (11th Cir. 
May 5, 2003)). 
123 As Paisley Currah has noted, the ruling in Youngblood:  
depended on and reproduced the same commonsense notions about gender that 
undergirded the judge’s reasoning in Doe v. Yunits: Pat Doe and Nikki Youngblood 
are both girls, and girls do and should wear girls’ clothes. Doe v. Yunits was a legal 
victory because the judge . . . affirmed Doe’s gender identity. Youngblood v. School 
Board of Hillsborough County was a legal defeat because the judge in this case found 
the gender expression claim unfathomable. 
Id. at 11-12. 
124 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).  
125 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
126 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).  
127 119 F.3d at 566-67. 
128 256 F.3d at 870 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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was a gay man whose male coworkers teased him because of the way that he 
walked, referred to him using female terms of endearment, and touched him 
in sexual ways.129 None of these plaintiffs was a man seeking to become, or 
claiming to be, a woman. None challenged sex-specific grooming codes.130 
Instead, all were men perceived to fit imperfectly within the male gender 
category and who became, as a result, a target of harassment and discrimina-
tion. The courts in all three cases held that the alleged harassment violated 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping.131 A principle of category 
neutrality cannot explain courts’ willingness to invoke the prohibition on 
sex stereotyping to protect these workers who blur rather than jump gender 
categories.  
A category-neutrality requirement also implicates some of the same 
conceptual problems raised by the trait-neutrality requirement. Category 
neutrality requires that employers be neutral as to which gender category 
workers satisfy. It does not require employers to accept new or blurry 
gender categories. When, however, is a male-to-female transsexual expressing 
a feminine gender identity in the same way as a biological woman, and 
when is she occupying some third gender category?132 Indeterminacy in 
naming what the plaintiff is doing leads, as it did with the trait-neutrality 
requirement, to indeterminacy in assessing whether neutrality is violated or 
achieved. 
Perhaps courts’ focus in applying the sex stereotyping prohibition is not 
on avoiding the narrow harm of gender miscategorization, but on avoiding 
the more general harm of highly burdensome gender demands that make 
workplace participation for some workers particularly difficult. In the next 
Part, I suggest that, while not doing so explicitly, courts have in fact 
 
129 305 F.3d at 1064.  
130 One of the brothers in Doe, H., did wear an earring, which seemed to incite some harass-
ment. 119 F.3d at 566-67. In doing so, however, H. did not violate any workplace grooming code, 
and H., like the other plaintiffs in these cases, seemed to comply with any formal and informal 
dress and grooming codes applied to men in these workplaces. 
131 Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (“[T]his is a case of actionable gender 
stereotyping harassment.”); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (“Price Waterhouse sets a rule that bars 
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes. That rule squarely applies to preclude the harassment 
here.”); Doe, 119 F.3d at 581 (relying on Price Waterhouse’s prohibition on sex stereotyping to 
conclude that “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is 
long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his 
coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex”). 
132 This question of whether a cross-dressing plaintiff occupies a conventional gender category 
or some new category was a critical one for the court in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 
2002 WL 31098541, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (finding the plaintiff had not failed to conform 
to a gender stereotype, but rather “disguised himself as a person of a different sex and presented 
himself as a female for stress relief and to express his gender identity”). 
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adopted a burden-shifting framework for analyzing and applying the sex 
stereotyping prohibition, with the compliance costs for the plaintiff being 
the prime trigger for switching the evidentiary burden to the employer.  
V. BURDEN SHIFTING 
It may be that the sex stereotyping prohibition in practice reflects not a 
discrete principle, but instead a process for evaluating employee challenges 
to gender conformity demands. In assessing a claim, courts first look to see 
how burdensome the conformity demand is for the plaintiff. Only if a 
threshold level is reached does a presumption of impermissibility attach. 
Even then, however, the presumption can be overcome if the employer can 
show a business justification for the demand. Although never stated explicitly, 
the sex stereotyping prohibition operates, in effect, as a burden-shifting 
framework.  
While a violation of neither gender freedom nor neutrality alone triggers 
protection from a conformity demand under the sex stereotyping prohibition, 
both factors contribute to the overall burdensomeness of a conformity 
demand, and hence may play a role in the burden-shifting framework. It 
certainly did matter to the Sixth Circuit in Smith, for example, that the 
behavior for which the plaintiff sought protection was recognized by the 
court as a conventional expression of gender.133 Had Smith sought protection 
for some entirely idiosyncratic form of personal expression—like wearing a 
Barney costume—she certainly would have lost. The fact that gender 
expression is at stake matters. It may help the plaintiff reach the threshold 
needed for protection, but it simply does not get the plaintiff there on its 
own.  
The fact that a plaintiff is using the sex stereotyping prohibition to 
redress nonneutral treatment is likewise significant. A transsexual male-to-
female plaintiff who wants to wear a dress to work, in contravention of her 
employer’s grooming code, is more likely to win if the challenged grooming 
code allows women, but not men, to wear dresses, than if the grooming code 
requires that all employees wear blue pants and white oxford shirts to work. 
Courts’ commitment to neutral treatment is real; it is simply not outcome 
determinative in the way courts’ rhetoric suggests.  
The factor that seems most critical to whether the employee reaches the 
threshold necessary to raise a presumption of illegality is the one about 
 
133 See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that Smith “began 
‘expressing a more feminine appearance’” at work and was challenged by coworkers because her 
“appearance and mannerisms were not ‘masculine enough’”). 
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which courts have been least explicit—namely, the level of difficulty for the 
plaintiff to comply with the gender demand at issue. High compliance 
costs—physical, emotional, or professional134—seem essential to reaching the 
threshold level necessary to shift the evidentiary burden. When compliance 
with a gender demand is very difficult for an employee, the presumption of 
illegality attaches. Plaintiffs then win protection unless the employer is able 
to name a business justification of some special weight.135 When compliance 
with a gender demand appears easy or trivial, the threshold is not met, and 
courts never even look to see whether the employer has a business justifica-
tion for the conformity demand.  
Courts’ concern with the difficulty of compliance provides an alternative 
explanation to the category-neutrality reading for courts’ heavy reliance on 
medical evidence in these cases. Medical testimony regarding GID points 
not only to one’s gender category, but also necessarily to the pain one would 
experience if forced to alter a particular gender expression.  
Indeed, evidence of the plaintiff’s pain seemed critical to the court’s 
ruling in Doe v. Yunits, where the court relied on expert medical testimony 
to conclude that forcing the plaintiff to come to school in boys’ clothes 
would actually “endanger her psychiatric health.”136 Moreover, the medical 
evidence helped the court to distinguish Doe from Harper v. Edgewood Board 
of Education137 in which a court upheld a school board’s right to prevent two 
students from attending the prom in clothing of the opposite gender. In 
that case, the court treated the students’ efforts to gender bend as a matter 
of whimsy or teenage rebellion. Doe, the Yunits court emphasized, in 
contrast to Harper, “is not merely engaging in rebellious acts to demonstrate 
a willingness to violate community norms; plaintiff is expressing her 
personal identity . . . .”138 As such, the costs of compliance for Doe, with her 
school’s gender conformity demands, were significantly higher, and it was 
these costs that were critical to her ultimate victory.  
Medical evidence appeared to play a similar role in Smith. Smith, the 
court emphasized, suffered from Gender Identity Disorder. Her female 
gender expression, through dress and grooming, was part of the accepted 
 
134 A gender conformity demand would be professionally difficult for the plaintiff to comply 
with if it conflicted with actual job demands. This situation would capture the narrow set of 
double-bind cases with fact patterns similar to that in Price Waterhouse. 
135 By some “special” weight, I mean some justification beyond a generalized desire for 
comfort on the part of the employer and its customers.  
136 No. 00-1060, 2001 WL 664947, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001).  
137 655 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 
138 Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6 n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) 
(granting the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction). 
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medical treatment of her condition.139 As in Yunits, this information seemed 
important to the court because it reinforced that for Smith, cross-dressing 
was not a voluntary choice but a medical necessity—one that could be 
avoided only with great pain and hardship.140  
Likewise in Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp.,141 the court relied on medical 
evidence to highlight the involuntary nature of the plaintiff’s gender 
nonconformity. Lie, a preoperative male-to-female transsexual, sued for sex 
discrimination under state law after she was fired for wearing female clothes 
to work.142 The trial court, in denying defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, emphasized the plaintiff’s evidence showing her lack of control 
over her gender expressions. The court explained:  
The plaintiff avers that she is a biological male who has desired to live as a 
woman for a number of years, that she has been diagnosed with gender 
identity disorder, that she engages in psychotherapy, and that she takes 
hormones as part of her treatment . . . . Consequently, the plaintiff has 
alleged sufficient facts to establish she is a transsexual, not simply a man 
who prefers traditionally female attire.143  
Again, it was plaintiff’s lack of control over her own noncompliance that 
seemed critical to Lie’s ultimate protection.  
A burden-shifting framework can explain not only transsexuals’ recent 
victories, but also the one type of case that transsexuals continue to routinely 
lose: cases asserting transsexual workers’ right to use the bathroom appro-
priate to their gender rather than their sex. These cases are inexplicable 
under the category-neutrality reading of the prohibition. Courts continue to 
permit employers to “miscategorize” transsexual employees when it comes 
to bathroom usage by requiring transsexual workers to use the bathroom 
associated with their biological sex rather than their true gender. The cases 
are, however, explicable under a burden-shifting framework. Courts permit 
employers to require employees to use the bathroom associated with their 
biological sex because they respect employers’ claims that such physically 
based categorization is necessary to protect the personal privacy of other 
restroom users. Although the transsexual plaintiffs are able to show compli-
 
139 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). 
140 See Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law?, 20 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 179 (2005) (“Although the [Smith] court did not say so 
explicitly, this medical authority seemed to influence the court in seeing Smith’s behavior as 
pursuant to trustworthy medical advice, and therefore less her fault or choice.”).  
141 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 412 (Super. Ct. 2002). 
142 Id. at 413. 
143 Id. 
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ance costs necessary to establish a presumption of illegality, employers in 
the bathroom cases are able to rebut the presumption and avoid liability by 
raising concerns about coworker and customer privacy.  
Consider, for example, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority.144 Etsitty was a 
preoperative male-to-female transsexual who had been diagnosed with 
GID.145 At the time Etsitty began working as a bus operator with the Utah 
Transit Authority (UTA) she presented herself as a man.146 Soon thereafter, 
however, Etsitty informed her employer that she was transsexual and would 
begin to present as female at work and to use female restrooms while on her 
route.147 The UTA terminated Etsitty explaining that it was unable to 
“accommodate her restroom needs.”148 Etsitty sued for sex discrimination 
and lost.149 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.150  
Certainly Etsitty’s gender expression was difficult for her to change. In 
addition to being diagnosed with GID, Etsitty had begun the transition 
from male to female by taking female hormones.151 Nonetheless, the court 
ruled against Etsitty on her sex discrimination claim. Although Etsitty had 
made out a “prima facie” case of sex stereotyping, the court concluded that 
the employer had a legitimate business justification for burdening the 
plaintiff’s gender expression in this way.152 The court’s reference in Etsitty 
to a “prima facie” case is strange, but revealing. The language nominally 
tracks the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas,153 which was 
designed to help courts identify the true reason behind the employer’s 
adverse employment action. In Etsitty, however, there was no dispute over 
the reason for the employer’s decision. It was clear that the employer made 
its decision about bathroom usage because of Etsitty’s sex. The Etsitty 
court’s use of McDonnell Douglas–type language does suggest, however, that 
it is using a similar burden-shifting framework to determine liability, albeit 
with different underlying evidentiary assessments at stake. Even though the 
UTA had not received any complaints about Etsitty’s bathroom usage,154 the 
 
144 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
145 Id. at 1218.  
146 Id. at 1219.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 1219-20 
150 Id. at 1228. 
151 Id. at 1218.  
152 Id. at 1224.  
153 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The complainant in a 
Title VII trial must carry the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case of . . . discrimination.”).  
154 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1226. 
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UTA’s “legitimate” concerns about potential liability from having a biological 
male use women’s public restrooms justified its prohibition on her doing so 
and overcame any presumption of illegality.155 In terms of outcome, the 
Etsitty ruling is typical. Preoperative transsexual plaintiffs routinely lose sex 
discrimination cases in which they challenge their employers’ bathroom 
assignments.156  
It is worth emphasizing how different my reading of the transsexual sex 
discrimination cases is from that offered by scholars who adopt a more 
libertarian view of the prohibition at work in the cases. Elizabeth Glazer 
and Zachary Kramer, in their article Transitional Discrimination,157 as well as 
 
155 Id. at 1224. The court explained:  
The record also reveals UTA believed, and Etsitty has not demonstrated otherwise, 
that it was not possible to accommodate her bathroom usage because UTA drivers 
typically use public restrooms along their routes rather than restrooms at the UTA 
facility. UTA states it was concerned the use of women’s public restrooms by a bio-
logical male could result in liability for UTA. This court agrees with the district 
court that such a motivation constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
Etsitty’s termination under Title VII.  
Id. Although the court does not elaborate on the basis for UTA’s potential liability, the intimation 
is that the liability would stem from invasion of privacy claims brought by other restroom users.  
156 See Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 F. App’x 461, 462 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(affirming without explanation the district court’s dismissal of a female transsexual worker’s Title 
VII sex discrimination claim based on the employer’s requirement that she use the men’s rather 
than the women’s restroom); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531, 2006 WL 
2460636, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) (granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
on a male-to-female transsexual worker’s claim of sex discrimination stemming from her 
employer’s requirement that she could not use the women’s restroom until she had presented 
proof that she had completed a sex change operation), aff ’d, 325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009). But 
see Michaels v. Akal Sec., Inc., No. 09-01300, 2010 WL 2573988, at *4 (D. Colo. June 24, 2010) 
(agreeing with Etsitty that restrictions on a transsexual worker’s bathroom usage does not itself 
establish sex discrimination, but holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded pretext to 
survive a motion to dismiss). Bathroom discrimination claims brought under state statutes 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination have been similarly unsuccessful. See Goins v. W. 
Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722-23 (Minn. 2001) (holding that an employer’s requirement that a male-
to-female transsexual use only a unisex restroom rather than the women’s restroom did not 
constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, 
which defined sexual orientation to include “having or being perceived as having a self-image or 
identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness” (quoting MINN. 
STAT. § 363.01 (2000)). This provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act has been renumbered 
as § 363A.03. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03 (West 2008).  
Certainly these are not the first cases in which courts have subordinated employees’ anti-
discrimination interests to the privacy interests of customers or coworkers. Courts regularly 
privilege such privacy interests in cases in which employers seek to engage in sex-based hiring of 
workers engaged in positions that involve the seeing or touching of unclothed customers or 
coworkers. See Yuracko, supra note 68, at 156-57.  
157 Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651 (2009).  
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Anna Kirkland, in her book Fat Rights,158 criticize courts’ decisions in the 
transsexual sex discrimination cases for not giving enough weight to plaintiffs’ 
transsexualism. They argue that the sex stereotyping prohibition reduces 
these plaintiffs to men who simply like to wear women’s clothes and reduces 
the protection they seek to mere protection for cross-dressing. Glazer and 
Kramer, for example, argue that under the court’s approach in Smith, 
“Smith’s reasons for wanting to change her appearance in the workplace 
simply did not matter; the only thing that did matter for the court’s theory 
to work is that Smith wanted to dress and behave in a way that is incompat-
ible with stereotypical expectations of masculinity.”159 Similarly, Kirkland 
contends that “[t]ranssexuals or transgender people per se do not really exist 
in the Smith opinion; there just happen to be some men out there who want 
to wear dresses.”160  
In contrast, I argue that transsexuals are successful under the sex stereo-
typing prohibition precisely because they are not simply men wearing 
women’s clothes and, in large part, because they are transsexual. Transsexuals 
are winning because they are able to use medical evidence of their GID to 
convince courts that compliance with sex-based gender norms would be 
particularly painful and difficult for them.161 Such evidence of pain creates a 
presumption of illegality and switches the burden of proof to the employer. 
Indeed, the burden-shifting framework helps explain why transsexuals 
are succeeding in their challenges to sex-based grooming requirements while 
 
158 ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 
(2008).  
159 Glazer & Kramer, supra note 157, at 666.  
160 KIRKLAND, supra note 158, at 86; see also Anna Kirkland, What’s at Stake in Transgender 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination?, 32 SIGNS 83, 94 (2006) (“The [Smith] case reduces the story 
of gender oppression to a story about stereotypes and makes [male-to-female transsexuals] into 
men who wear dresses and makeup.”).  
161 The instrumental importance of medical evidence in these cases has not been lost on 
transsexual advocates. See Jerry L. Dasti, Note, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the Necessity 
of Sex-Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1738, 1758 (2002) (noting that “[t]he 
explanation of transgender identities in medical and diagnostic terms is common throughout the 
case law, even in cases that do not deal specifically with sex-reassignment surgery or sex designa-
tion,” and that “it is the transgender party who inserts the medical analysis into the record” as a 
strategic way to give “legitimacy to a transgender identity”); see also Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t 
Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 90-91 
(2006) (explaining that the recent success of some transgender litigants is due to their ability to 
introduce medical evidence of their GID to highlight for the court “the essentialism of gender 
identity and its inelasticity for a specific individual”); Romeo, supra note 9, at 733 (“The result of 
courts’ reliance on the medical model of gender is that those instances of gender nonconformity 
recognized by the medical establishment are portrayed as real and legitimate—and therefore 
worthy of at least some legal protections—while other transgressive experiences of gender are 
viewed as unreal, fraudulent, or illegitimate.”).  
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nontranssexuals are not. Under a burden-shifting framework, non-
transsexual gender benders lose precisely because courts view the burden of 
the conformity demands imposed on them as trivial. They do not reach the 
threshold level necessary even to warrant a response or justification by their 
employer. In Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., for example, the Iowa Supreme 
Court upheld an employer’s right to terminate a male employee for refusing 
to remove his ear stud; it emphasized that the requirement was one with 
which the employee could easily comply.162 “Wearing an ear stud is not an 
immutable characteristic,” the court noted.163 “Pecenka can remove his ear 
stud or cover it with a bandage.”164 Similarly, in Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., the district court upheld an employer’s sex-specific requirement that 
male employees keep their hair above the collar, emphasizing that “hair 
length is not an immutable characteristic, for it may be changed at will.”165 
“[D]iscrimination based on factors of personal preference” the court 
explained, “do not necessarily restrict employment opportunities and thus 
are not forbidden.”166 In Jespersen as well, the court seemed to belittle the 
burden of the makeup requirement on Jespersen by emphasizing that 
compliance, or lack thereof, was simply a matter of personal choice.167 
According to the court, Jespersen’s desire not to wear makeup was based on 
her “subjective reaction”168 and desire “to be true to herself and to the image 
that she wishe[d] to project to the world.”169  
 
162 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003). 
163 Id. at 805. 
164 Id. The court also emphasized that the employer’s male-only earring ban did not reinforce 
women’s or men’s subordination in the workplace. The court noted that Pecenka did not “contend 
that the unwritten personal grooming code perpetuates a sexist or chauvinistic attitude in employ-
ment that significantly affects his employment opportunities.” Id.; see also Lockhart v. La.-Pac. 
Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 603 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a no facial jewelry rule for male, but not 
female, employees explaining that “[o]nly those distinctions between the sexes which are based on 
immutable, unalterable, or constitutionally protected personal characteristics are forbidden” (quoting 
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Wash. Human Rights Comm’n, 544 P.2d 98, 100 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976))). 
165 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
166 Id. at 1256. The Austin court also emphasized that the sex-specific grooming requirement 
at issue did not raise antisubordination-oriented concerns. See id. (“The objective of Title VII is to 
equalize employment opportunities. Consequently, discrimination based on either immutable sex 
characteristics or constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or child rearing violate Title 
VII because they present obstacles to the employment of one sex that cannot be overcome . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
167 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(refusing to extend Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping to “every grooming, apparel, or 
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her 
own self-image”). 
168 Id. at 1113. 
169 Id. at 1112. 
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Unlike the category-neutrality reading, the burden-shifting framework 
even offers a plausible explanation for courts’ protection of men harassed 
because of their perceived effeminacy. The plaintiffs in such cases do not 
seek to switch gender categories, but only to deviate from particular gender 
expectations. As a result, such plaintiffs would not be entitled to protection 
under the category-neutrality principle. It may be, however, that courts 
protect effeminate men from harassment because they perceive the gender 
conformity demands in those cases to be particularly difficult to meet. 
Typically, male workers harassed for perceived effeminacy are not harassed 
because of a discrete trait that they can easily change. Instead, they are 
harassed because of how they walk, talk, and stand—traits that are largely 
unconscious and difficult to alter. Moreover, employers in such cases do not 
claim a business need for enforcing masculinity.  
Consider, for example, the harassment suffered by Antonio Sanchez in 
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.170 Sanchez, a food server, was 
harassed for “walking and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman.’”171 
Whatever it was about Sanchez’s movement that made Sanchez’s coworkers 
refer to him as “she” and “her”172 was not susceptible to easy identification 
or a quick fix. Indeed, the harassers themselves would probably have strug-
gled to describe precisely what about Sanchez’s movements they found 
objectionable. Even if they could, it would have been extremely difficult for 
Sanchez to alter his walk and movements so as to eliminate the offending 
affect. Changing one’s comportment and mannerisms is not like changing 
one’s shirt. It is more like changing one’s way of being in the world. 
Consider also the harassment faced by sixteen-year-old H. Doe in Doe v. 
City of Belleville.173 H. Doe was subjected to repeated physical and verbal 
harassment focused on his inadequate masculinity.174 Certainly, H. Doe’s 
earring was a focal point of harassment.175 Yet it is unlikely that the harass-
ment would have ceased, or never started, if H. Doe had simply removed 
the earring.176 The harassment was prompted not by a discrete, easily 
identifiable action on H. Doe’s part. It was prompted and driven by the 
 
170 256 F.3d 864, 869-71 (9th Cir. 2001). 
171 Id. at 870. 
172 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
173 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 532 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
174 Id. at 566-67. In addition to other incidents of physical and verbal harassment, H. Doe 
was regularly called “queer” and “fag,” was asked, “Are you a boy or a girl?” and was referred to by 
his primary harasser as his “bitch.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175 Id. 
176 Indeed, H.’s brother J. was also harassed, albeit less severely, despite not wearing an 
earring. See id. (describing incidents of harassment of J., including being referred to as “fat boy”). 
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gestalt of how H. Doe presented himself—the way in which he occupied 
and moved his body.177 As with Sanchez, identifying what exactly it was 
about H. Doe’s self-presentation, much less getting H. Doe to change it, 
would likely be impossible.178  
This reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition as establishing a burden-
shifting framework for analyzing claims is certainly more modest than 
courts’ rhetoric suggests, yet it has real explanatory power. The prohibition-
as-burden-shifting framework provides the most comprehensive and coherent 
account of how the sex stereotyping prohibition currently operates. With 
this model in mind of how the prohibition works in practice, rather than in 
theory, I turn in the next Part to the likely legal and cultural implications of 
the sex stereotyping prohibition at work. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
Certainly, prohibiting sex stereotyping through a burden-shifting 
framework will not, as some scholars have hoped, lead to an end of gender 
code enforcement in the workplace. Courts’ heavy focus on compliance costs 
means that employers may continue to enforce sex-based gender codes, even 
when such codes are grounded in stereotypes, as long as courts deem 
compliance relatively easy for workers. Employees may win protection from 
such demands only when courts believe that compliance is particularly 
burdensome.  
In practice this means that those to whom I refer as “garden variety 
gender benders”—those who do not seek to switch gender categories but 
instead to reject discrete aspects of their prescribed gender code while 
maintaining conformity with others—will (continue to) lack protection. 
Male workers who are generally comfortable with their masculinity will not 
be protected if they want to express their feminine side through dangling 
earrings or nail polish in violation of their employer’s grooming code for 
men. Female workers who are generally comfortable with their femininity 
 
177 As the court explained: “H. Doe [did] not su[e] Belleville in order to challenge a work-
place rule that forbade him from wearing an earring[;]” rather, he sued because “his gender had 
something to do with the harassment heaped upon him.” Id. at 582.  
178 Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Gowri Ramachandran have offered a slightly different 
status-oriented reading of the effeminate men harassment cases—one focused on the status of 
homosexuality rather than gender. They contend that by using the sex stereotyping rhetoric of 
Price Waterhouse to protect effeminate men from harassment, courts “[q]uite possibly . . . were 
engaging in subversive judging—namely, enacting a minor rebellion against the Congressional 
refusal to provide any protection against sexual orientation discrimination.” Devon Carbado, Mitu 
Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 137 ( Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006). 
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will not be protected if they want to express a more masculine side by 
rejecting such adornments in violation of their employer’s grooming code 
for women. Such workers will be unable to convince courts that non-
compliance reflects some essential gender core rather than more transient 
personal preference. Without new medical evidence to the contrary, courts 
will continue to view noncompliance as a matter of personal taste, and 
compliance as relatively painless.  
What may be less clear, and more pernicious, is that the burden-shifting 
framework may actually reinforce gender stereotypes and encourage highly 
stereotypical behavior in the workplace. Given the courts’ focus on compli-
ance costs, employees must prove that the gender attribute at issue is a core 
part of their gender identity. An attribute looks more essential to the extent 
that it fits within a coherent gender package. As a result, in the quest for 
protection, gender-bending workers have an incentive to exaggerate their 
gender dysphoria by conforming those traits about which the worker feels 
less strongly to the gender of the traits for which the worker seeks protection. 
The result, somewhat oddly, is that workers may adopt a more extreme 
gender dysphoria than they actually feel, and manifest this dysphoria 
through more consistent and coherent expression of the opposite sex 
gender. 
This pressure to overperform dysphoria to the point of adopting a stereo-
typical gender package is clear in the transsexual cases. Indeed, the very 
diagnosis of GID, which has been so important to transsexual victories, 
requires allegiance to a traditional gender script, including stories of 
childhood participation in stereotypically gender-inappropriate behavior,179 
 
179 See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 
24 (2003) (“Symptoms of GID in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) describe at 
length the symptom of childhood participation in stereotypically gender inappropriate behavior.”). 
Spade further notes that  
[t]he diagnostic criteria for GID produces a fiction of natural gender in which 
normal, non-transsexual people grow up with minimal to no gender trouble or ex-
ploration, do not crossdress as children, do not play with the wrong-gendered toys, 
and do not like the wrong kinds of toys and characters. This story is not believable.  
Id. at 25. The DSM-IV-TR characterizes “boys” with GID as those who “particularly enjoy 
playing house, drawing pictures of beautiful girls and princesses, and watching television or videos 
of their favorite female characters . . . . They avoid rough-and-tumble play and competitive sports 
and have little interest in cars and trucks . . . .” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 576. The DSM-IV-
TR characterizes “girls” with GID as those who “display intense negative reactions to paren-
tal . . . attempts to have them wear dresses, . . . prefer boys’ clothing and short hair,” are interested 
in “contact sports, [and] rough-and-tumble play.”). DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 576-77. 
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evidence of “a strong and persistent cross-gender identification”180 and “the 
ability to inhabit and perform the new gender category ‘successfully.’”181 
The diagnosis pressures transsexuals to downplay or reject aspects of their 
gender identity that conform readily to their biological sex. As Franklin 
Romeo has explained:  
The diagnostic criteria of GID do not challenge gender norms so much as 
they provide a mechanism for some people to substitute the gender norms 
of their lived gender for the norms of their birth sex. Moreover, the medical 
model of gender holds transgender people to hyper-normative standards 
regarding their lived gender—thereby reifying the idea that ‘real’ men and 
women look and act a certain way. These hyper-normative standards do not 
reflect the experiences of a great number of gender nonconforming people, 
and fail to recognize the complexity of experiences among gender trans-
gressive people.182  
Transsexual workers are pushed to play the part of highly stylized men and 
women even if they would be more comfortable with mixed or ambiguous 
gender packages.183 
The pressure faced by nontranssexual workers is similar, though less 
obvious. Under a burden-shifting approach, a plaintiff seeking protection 
for gender-nonconforming conduct must convince a court that abandoning 
 
180 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 576. Such an identification “must not merely be a desire for 
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex.” Id. 
181 Spade, supra note 179, at 26. Spade is critical that “success” necessarily means adherence 
to established gender norms. Id. For a female-to-male transsexual, tips for successful performance 
of masculinity  
focus on an adherence to traditional aesthetics of masculinity, warning [female-to-
male transsexuals] to avoid “punk” hair cuts, black leather jackets and other trappings 
associated with butch lesbians. A preppy, clean-cut look is often suggested as the 
best aesthetic for passing. Again, this establishes the requirement that gender 
transgressive people be even more “normal” than “normal people” when it comes to 
gender presentation, thereby discouraging gender disruptive behavior.  
Id. at 27 (describing the work of Judith Halberstam in her article, Transgender Butch: Butch/FTM 
Border Wars and the Masculine Continuum, 4 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 287 (1998)). 
182 Romeo, supra note 9, at 731.  
183 See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal 
Conceptualization of Gender that Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
253, 297 (2005) (“In my experience, a person who was assigned male at birth and identifies as 
female has the best chance of having her self-identified gender confirmed by the courts if her 
medical experts testify that she is a feminine woman, a woman who played with dolls when she 
was young, a heterosexual woman, a woman with genital surgery, and so on. A gender non-
conforming transgender person stands very little chance of having their self-identified gender 
recognized by the courts.”). 
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the trait at issue would be painful and difficult. One way to do so is to show 
that the challenged gender expression is a function of the plaintiff’s core, 
stable personality rather than an expression of individual autonomy or 
personal taste. A plaintiff’s gender-nonconforming conduct is likely to look 
more stable and immutable to the extent that it is part of a broad, con-
sistent, and stereotypical pattern of gender nonconformity.  
To see why this is so, consider again Darlene Jespersen’s challenge to 
Harrah’s makeup requirement for female bartenders. Under a burden-
shifting test, Jespersen would need to convince the court that compliance 
with the rule would be psychically, if not physically, painful for her. 
Transgender advocates in fact made precisely this argument on her behalf in 
their amici brief. The National Center for Lesbian Rights and the Trans-
gender Law Center argued that requiring Jespersen to wear makeup was 
“contrary to [her] own innate identity and sense of self” and was “a serious, 
invasive, and demeaning experience and may be as debilitating to an 
individual as being subjected to sexual or gender-based harassment.”184 The 
court was unconvinced and instead treated Jespersen’s desire to leave her 
face makeup-free as simply a matter of personal preference.185 The court’s 
skepticism may have stemmed in part from Jespersen’s failure to object to 
any of the other feminine grooming requirements Harrah’s imposed on her. 
Had Jespersen objected to all of Harrah’s feminine grooming requirements 
and instead consistently sought to present herself according to Harrah’s 
masculine grooming code, the court might have viewed her opposition to 
makeup with a bit more respect. Certainly, such an unyielding position 
 
184 Brief for Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law Ctr. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, at 12, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (No. 03-15045), 2005 WL 1501598. More generally, the groups argued:  
Just as a person’s core gender identity as male or female is innate, a person’s relative 
degree of masculinity or femininity is also deep-seated and generally impervious to 
manipulation or change . . . .  
[W]orkplace rules affecting a person’s core gender identity and outward expres-
sion of masculinity or femininity are not trivial, but rather touch on profound and 
fundamental aspects of the self. For an employer to require a person to adopt a 
gendered appearance that conflicts with the person’s core identity is intrusive and 
humiliating and may seriously impair a person’s well-being and ability to function.  
Id. at 11-12. 
185 See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (“We respect Jespersen’s resolve to be true to herself and 
to the image that she wishes to project to the world. We cannot agree, however, that her objection 
to the makeup requirement, without more, can give rise to a claim of sex stereotyping under Title 
VII. If we were to do so, we would come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, 
or appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or 
her own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.”). 
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would have approached that of the plaintiffs in Smith and Yunits, both of 
whom were granted gender nonconformity protection. 
Indeed, the burden-shifting framework, with its high threshold for 
protection, not only encourages a particular kind of gender performance, it 
actually reinforces a particular understanding of gender. Again, such 
entrenchment for transsexuals is clear. Reliance by courts on the medical 
definition of GID entrenches in law and society a particular understanding 
of how transsexuals experience their gender. Transsexuals must experience 
and express a strong commitment to the gender norms typically associated 
with the other sex.  
There remains a great deal that is unknown about transsexualism.186 
Certainly, it is possible that narratives about how transsexuals experience 
gender may be erroneous or, at least, too narrow.187 Nonetheless, once 
 
186 See Randi Ettner, The Etiology of Transsexualism, in PRINCIPLES OF TRANSGENDER 
MEDICINE AND SURGERY 1, 9 (Randi Ettner et al. eds., 2007) (asserting that “the sheer sweeping 
heterogeneity of the condition [transsexualism] itself impends a strictly biological explanation”); 
P.T. Cohen-Kettenis & L.J.G. Gooren, Transsexualism: A Review of Etiology, Diagnosis and Treatment, 
46 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 315, 318-19 (1999) (describing studies linking transsexualism to 
prenatal hormone exposure or to sex differences in the hypothalamus); Frank P.M. Kruijver et al., 
Male-to-Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL 
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034, 2041 (2000) (presenting data supporting the view that 
“transsexualism may reflect a form of brain hermaphroditism such that this limbic nucleus itself is 
structurally sexually differentiated opposite to the transsexual’s genetic and genital sex” and noting 
that “[i]t is conceivable that this dichotomy is just the tip of the iceberg and holds also true for 
many other sexually dimorphic brain areas”); see also GEND. IDENTITY RESEARCH & EDUC. 
SOC’Y, DEFINITION & SYNOPSIS OF THE ETIOLOGY OF GENDER VARIANCE 3 (July 18, 2009), 
available at http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/Research-Assets/etiology.pdf (hypothesizing that “hor-
mones significantly influence” the “dimorphic development” of gender though noting that “the exact 
mechanism is incompletely understood”); GEND. IDENTITY RESEARCH & EDUC. SOC’Y, GENDER 
VARIANCE (DYSPHORIA) 4 (Aug. 31, 2008), available at http://www.gires.org.uk/assets/gdev/ 
gender-dysphoria.pdf (discussing how “[t]he experience of extreme gender variance is increasingly 
understood in scientific and medical disciplines as having a biological origin. The current medical 
viewpoint . . . is that this condition . . . is strongly associated with unusual neurodevelopment of 
the brain at the fetal stage”).  
187 See, e.g., LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM 
JOAN OF ARC TO RUPAUL ix (1996) (“[T]here are no pronouns in the English language as 
complex as I am, and I do not want to simplify myself in order to neatly fit one or the other.”); 
RIKI ANN WILCHINS, READ MY LIPS: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER 13 
(1997) (“Under the broad label of transpeople . . . —there is an extraordinarily rich and vibrant 
diversity.”); Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial 
Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1999) (“Transsexuals vary widely in their 
embrace or rejection of a specific ‘transexual identity,’ and in the creative manner in which they 
combine or separate that identity, gender identity (whether they consider themselves ‘men’ or 
‘women’), and sexual orientation identity. Those writings about transexuality are similarly varied 
in their characterization of the phenomenon.”); Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A 
Posttranssexual Manifesto, in BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 
280, 296 ( Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., 1991) (“To foreground the practices of inscription  
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courts rely on a particular medicalized conception of transsexualism, that 
understanding becomes entrenched in law and society more generally.188 As 
a result, those who do not experience transsexualism in the traditionally 
prescribed ways will either be (newly) pathologized or discredited. Either 
way, they are likely to be excluded from the current antidiscrimination 
framework.189 Those who seek to avoid such exclusion must articulate, if not 
actually experience, their gender in the ways courts say that they do.190  
Courts’ reliance on the prevailing medical narrative about transsexualism 
reifies not only transsexualism, but also gender more generally.191 Specifi-
cally, when medical experts testify that a plaintiff suffers from GID, they 
 
and reading which are part of this deliberate invocation of dissonance, I suggest constituting 
transsexuals not as a class or problematic ‘third gender,’ but rather as a genre—a set of embodied 
texts whose potential for productive disruption of structured sexualities and spectra of desire has 
yet to be explored.”); Vade, supra note 183, at 260 (“[S]ome male-to-female transgender people are 
butch lesbians. Some female-to-male transgender people like to cook and bake. And there are 
many transgender people who do not identify as either female or male, but as a third or other 
gender, such [as] trans or boy-girl, just to name a few.”).  
188 For a general discussion of the effect of such categorization in antidiscrimination law, see 
Grenfell, supra note 9, at 52 (“Through the process of categorization, legal narratives effectively 
strip the subject of agency by denying the subject the possibility of self-definition—for example, 
the agency to assert whether one is female, male, or neither. In this way, legal categories become 
constitutive of one’s identity . . . .”). 
189 Academics have taken note of this trend. See, e.g., Gilden, supra note 9, at 103 (“Much as 
an essentialized male/female binary renders unintelligible alternative gender identities, the 
articulation of an essentialized tertiary identity similarly marginalizes radical alternatives. If 
transsexuality only encompasses those trans people like Schroer who have been medically 
diagnosed as transsexuals and who conform to sex-stereotypes, then those trans people who most 
challenge normative sex/gender ideologies remain marginalized by trans jurisprudence.”). 
190 Dylan Vade makes this point quite concretely:  
When courts only recognize as ‘real’ those transgender people who fit narrow gender 
stereotypes, have multiple medical interventions, and engage in heterosexual inter-
course, then courts only grant custody, health benefits, and employment protections 
to transgender people who fit narrow gender stereotypes, have multiple medical 
interventions, and engage in heterosexual intercourse. Those clients of mine who do 
not fit the above requirements cannot make use of the legal protections. As a legal 
advocate for transgender people, this is a concern I face every day. 
Vade, supra note 183, at 256. For a more positive account of the role medical professionals play in 
improving the social and legal treatment of transsexuals, see Jennifer L. Levi, A Prescription for 
Gender: How Medical Professionals Can Help Secure Equality for Transgender People, 4 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 721, 735-36 (2003) (explaining that “medical experts can help to develop empathy in 
the greater community toward transgender litigants and, more specifically, help individual 
litigants to secure rights by chipping away at deeply held cultural prejudices that do not reflect 
medical realities”). 
191 Cf. Gilden, supra note 9, at 96-97 (“In describing a ‘biologically male’ transsexual as 
performing feminine acts, it furthers the construction of particular acts as inherently feminine and 
normatively conflated with biological femaleness.”). 
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are saying something not only about transsexualism but about femininity 
and masculinity more generally.192 
Consider, for example, the court’s effort in Doe v. Yunits to translate the 
documented medical evidence about transsexualism into “non-medical 
terminology.”193 According to the court, a diagnosis of GID signifies that 
“Doe has the soul of a female in the body of a male.”194 Having the soul of a 
female meant that Doe needed to wear stereotypically female clothing,195 
and that coming to school in boys’ clothing would “endanger her psychiatric 
health.”196 While Doe made this latter contention and did not need to prove 
it in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court did note approvingly that 
“there is evidence in the court file to support this allegation.”197 
In Schroer, the plaintiff presented testimony from two expert witnesses. 
The first was a medical doctor and the second was a licensed social worker 
who served as Schroer’s treating therapist during her transition. The 
medical doctor testified that “gender identity can be viewed as the sex of 
the brain, which, once established, cannot be changed.”198 Transsexuals, he 
explained, “experience incongruence between their sex assigned at birth and 
their gender identity.”199 The therapist spoke more specifically about her 
diagnosis of Schroer as transsexual. She testified that Schroer “has a female 
gender identity and is a woman.”200 The therapist explained that she had 
reached her conclusion by “continually assess[ing] [Schroer’s] female 
 
192 See Keller, supra note 187, at 353 (“The most common or notorious model for describing 
the transsexual condition, by academics writing about transsexuals, by transsexuals themselves, and 
by judges, is a vision of the transsexual as a woman/man trapped in a man/woman’s body.”); Levi, 
supra note 190, at 736 (describing the “classic description” of transsexuals as “being trapped in the 
‘wrong body’”); Vade, supra note 183, at 285 (“Transgender people often are defined as ‘having a 
mismatch of gender and sex.’”). 
193 No. 00-1060, 2001 WL 664947, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001) (denying in part 
defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
194 Id. Similarly, in ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction in the Doe v. Yunits litiga-
tion, the court asserted that the “[p]laintiff has been diagnosed with gender identity disorder, 
which means that, although plaintiff was born biologically male, she has a female gender identity.” 
Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff ’d sub 
nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-638, 2000 WL 33342399, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Nov. 30, 2000). 
195 For Doe, female clothing involved “such items as skirts and dresses, wigs, high-heeled 
shoes, and padded bras with tight shirts.” Id. at *1. 
196 Yunits, 2001 WL 664947, at *6. 
197 Id.  
198 See Bockting Report, supra note 102, at ¶ 32. 
199 See Supplemental Report of Walter O. Bockting, PhD at para. 5, Schroer II, 525 F. Supp. 
2d 58 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 05-1090), 2006 WL 4517047. 
200 Harris Report, supra note 101, at para. 22. 
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feelings and expression” and “evaluat[ing] Ms. Schroer’s life story.”201 She 
found evidence of Schroer’s womanhood in “Ms. Schroer’s level of cross-
dressing, her internal feelings about being female, [and] her inherent need 
to present as female.”202 In other words, in order to reach her conclusion 
that Schroer was transsexual, Schroer’s therapist needed to conclude that 
Schroer was a woman trapped in a man’s body. Schroer was a woman, the 
therapist knew, because Schroer did and thought what women do and think.  
However, even if the current medical establishment is correct about how 
most transsexuals experience their gender, it may still be mistaken in 
equating transsexuals’ experience of gender with that of nontranssexuals.203 
It is possible, for example, that transsexuals may have particularly strong 
gender associations that make cross-gender manifestations particularly 
painful.204 Transsexuals may experience gender more acutely than nontrans-
sexuals. Nontranssexuals may have weaker gender commitments than 
transsexuals.205  
Alternatively, even if transsexuals and nontranssexuals experience their 
core gender identity in similar ways, outward manifestations of gender may 
be more important for transsexuals than they are for nontranssexuals. 
Transsexuals may find that highly traditional outward gender manifesta-
tions are critically important to their gender identity because they simply 
cannot be recognized as their true gender unless their outward manifestations 
 
201 Id. at paras. 26 & 28. 
202 Id. at para. 28. 
203 For example, male-to-female transsexuals may not in fact experience their gender in the 
same ways that nontranssexual women experience theirs. See SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX 
COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING LAW 140 (2007) (describing her observation of a 
conference, during which female academics reacted to a transsexual scholar by complaining that 
the scholar did not understand what made them “women,” but instead mistook being a woman for 
wearing “a lot of makeup and very stereotypically feminine clothing”). 
204 See WORLD PROF’L ASS’N OF TRANSGENDER HEALTH, INC., THE HARRY BENJAMIN 
INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION’S STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER 
IDENTITY DISORDER 2 (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.wpath.org/documents2/socv6.pdf 
(“A clinical threshold [for transsexualism] is passed when concerns, uncertainties, and questions 
about gender identity persist during a person’s development, become so intense as to seem to be 
the most important aspect of a person’s life, or prevent the establishment of a relatively uncon-
flicted gender identity.”); see also Cohen-Kettenis & Gooren, supra note 186, at 319-20 (noting that 
“[n]ot all children with GID will turn out to be transsexuals after puberty” and explaining that it 
might be that “only very few extreme cases would become transsexuals, whereas the mild cases 
would become homo- or heterosexuals”).  
205 There exist highly divergent views about how nontranssexuals experience their gender. 
Compare Romeo, supra note 9, at 738-39 (arguing that gender should be recognized as “a funda-
mental aspect of human life, which every person has the capacity and inherent right to control”), 
with Levi, supra note 161, at 91 (“[U]ntil courts understand the inelasticity of gender for most 
individuals alongside its social construction, sex discrimination claims will have limited utility.”). 
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of gender are clear, strong, and uniform. Nontranssexuals may have much 
less difficulty having their gender recognized even if they send a range of 
more mixed and ambivalent signals through their outward manifestations—
clothes, hair, makeup, jewelry, etc. For both reasons, cross-gender manifes-
tations may be trivial for nontranssexuals while being truly painful for 
transsexuals. 
If, however, courts believe that women have female souls and that such 
souls require women to wear stereotypically feminine clothing, then the 
pain of women like Jespersen, who seek to challenge some but not all 
feminine gender conventions, will always be invisible. For Jespersen, 
wearing makeup should be pleasing and certainly could not be painful. 
Similarly, courts may be too willing to believe that women experience pain 
or discomfort from performing nontraditional jobs. This belief may make it 
more likely that courts will accept employers’ claims of a lack-of-interest 
defense in cases in which women have been excluded from nontraditional 
jobs. In her seminal article about the lack-of-interest defense, Vicki Schultz 
described the importance for blue-collar employers of describing jobs as 
physically “dirty.”206 Schultz explained that acceptance of the lack-of-
interest defense often followed “merely as a matter of ‘common sense’” 
from the courts’ acceptance of such a job description.207 To the extent that 
femininity continues to be associated with concerns about dress, beauty, and 
appearance, women’s exclusion from “dirty” jobs will continue to appear, at 
least plausibly, to be a matter of women’s choice. 
Perhaps even more troubling, however, is the fact that judicial concep-
tions of gender may become real—affecting how people view themselves, 
what they aspire to, and what they ultimately accomplish. Those who 
identify as gender female may, for example, come to believe that they really 
are, and must be, most comfortable wearing skirts and makeup. Hence they 
may shy away from jobs that require masculine attire and dirty physical 
labor. Those who identify as gender male may come to believe that they 
really are, and must be, aggressive and competitive. Hence they may shy 
away from jobs that require nurturing and caregiving.208 Legal scripts about 
 
206 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segrega-
tion in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 
1801-02 (1990) (arguing that, by using “heavily gendered terms” to describe nontraditional work, 
employers invoke masculine images that influence courts’ decisionmaking). 
207 Id. at 1802. 
208 Richard Ford has identified a similar danger in the race context, explaining: 
[T]he harm of misrecognition is that members of the misrecognized group may 
internalize the deprecating stereotypes of others. Such individuals, then, may not 
always appropriately determine what is fundamental to their identity, or better put,  
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gender do have the power to shape the actual lives of women and men.209 
The irony of the recent sex discrimination victories of gender nonconforming 
workers is that the sex stereotyping prohibition is being applied in such a 
way as to give even progressive courts an incentive to adopt highly essen-
tialized and traditional conceptions of masculinity and femininity.  
CONCLUSION 
The sex stereotyping prohibition certainly has brought about dramatic 
changes in antidiscrimination law. It has led to critical workplace protection 
for groups and individuals who were previously excluded from the law’s 
protection. Yet the prohibition has not delivered on its sweeping rhetorical 
promise. It has not put an end to gender stereotypes or the enforcement of 
gender codes and categories in the workplace. It has not led to workplaces 
in which gender is expressed freely, creatively, and idiosyncratically. 
Instead, its change has been more incremental. 
Courts have interpreted the prohibition in a highly pragmatic fashion—
hewing to a middle road that responds to demands both for employee 
inclusion and for employer control. Under this compromise approach, 
gender conformity demands are loosened only when they are particularly 
 
what should be fundamental to their identity. If misrecognition can lead people to 
fail to take advantage of opportunities even after “objective obstacles to their  
advancement fall away,” then misrecognition might also lead those same people to 
push for rights to self-detrimental traits and adopt misconceived legal strategies in 
the name of safeguarding an identity that was shaped by the misrecognition of others. 
Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 55 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
209 For a similar point about the dangers of entrenched categories in other contexts, see K. 
Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in 
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 149, 162 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1994) (“Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some 
scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper 
ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will be made.”); 
Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1811 (2000) (“The rights 
argument that protects culture as the authentic expression of the individual litigant must invite—
in fact it must require—courts to determine which expressions are authentic and therefore 
deserving of protection. The result will often be to discredit anyone who does not fit the culture 
style ascribed to her racial group.”); Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the 
Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 117 (David 
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“[I]f advocacy constructs identity, if it generates a script that identity 
bearers must heed, and if that script restricts group members, then identity politics compels its 
beneficiaries. Identity politics suddenly is no longer mere or simple resistance: It begins to look 
like power . . . . [W]henever activists invoke identity in ways that transform it, they may approach 
and even cross the dangerous line . . . between advocacy and coercion; they may interpellate 
subjects just as invidiously as Althusser’s imagined cop in the street.”). 
  
804 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 757 
 
burdensome or debilitating—either personally or professionally—for an 
individual worker. Only then are employers required to justify the demand. 
When the demands instead seem modest, courts avoid a fight, leave societal 
norms intact, and simply tell employees to play along. Employers need offer 
no justification for the demand. 
Although disappointing for those hoping for more radical change, the 
burden-shifting framework actually has much to recommend it. It will 
neither transcend gender, nor radically transform the workplace, but it does 
protect those who are most in need of protection and least able to exercise 
self-help. Moreover, by limiting the scope of protection, the approach 
avoids an all-out assault on gender norms and lessens the risk of popular 
backlash against courts and nonconformists.  
Yet the prohibition-as-burden-shifting framework raises its own risks—
risks which have not been previously recognized. In particular, it encourages 
gender nonconformists to adopt more highly dysphoric gender packages 
than they otherwise might, in order to bolster their claims that, for them, 
noncompliance is necessary. Whether pressure on gender nonconformists to 
over-perform their dysphoria is any worse than pressure to over-perform 
their sex-based gender code is a question about which I am agnostic. 
However, the pressure reinforces that—for those who do care deeply about 
free and authentic gender expression—the prohibition will not be a panacea, 
and that other sources of protection, whether legal or social, should be 
pursued.210 
More troubling is the fact that the burden-shifting framework, with its 
focus on compliance costs and threshold tests, encourages a medicalization 
of gender that threatens to entrench traditional notions of masculinity and 
femininity. The danger here flows not from burden shifting per se but from 
the type of medical evidence on which courts have been encouraged to rely 
in sex stereotyping cases. The result is a pitting of the interests of the 
individual plaintiff against the interests of women as a group, with individ-
ual plaintiffs relying on medical evidence that reinforces the very stereo-
types that have been instrumental in women’s subordination.  
 
210 See Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance 
Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (2006) (arguing that “the legal 
framework of autonomy privacy is a necessary supplement to the discrimination analysis that has 
dominated legal thinking for thirty-five years of challenges to workplace appearance requirements” 
(footnote omitted)) and Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 467, 488 (2007) (suggesting that strengthening unions could provide protection to 
workers like Jespersen, even when antidiscrimination law does not, because it is “the current 
imbalance of power that allows employers to impose many oppressive conditions that individual 
employees are left largely powerless to confront”). 
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Given the importance of medical evidence in the transsexual sex discrimi-
nation cases, the best (and perhaps the only) possible response to this danger 
is to urge advocates for transsexuals and other gender nonconformists to 
present their expert medical testimony in a more nuanced way—to high-
light, rather than elide, the differences among transsexuals, and to avoid 
linking the gender experiences of transsexuals with those of nontranssexuals. 
Transsexuals should win under a burden-shifting framework even if they do 
not experience their gender identity in precisely the same ways as nontrans-
sexuals. Treating transsexualism as a distinctive gender experience will 
reduce the danger that the essentialism so prevalent in the current diagnosis 
of GID will carry over into courts’ thinking about, and treatment of, women 
and men generally. 
I have tried in this Article to look inside the black box of the sex stereo-
typing prohibition to see how the prohibition works in practice, as opposed 
to in theory or aspiration. One benefit of such added clarity is that it may 
help advocates for nonconformists marshal evidence and structure argu-
ments to help their cases and expand protection for clients. It may also 
highlight what additional work needs to be done and what precautions 
should be taken. In this case, greater clarity seemingly does all three. 
Indeed, if my reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition at work is correct, 
it suggests that not only is the prohibition’s protection likely to be narrower 
than generally thought, but also that this incremental change may come at 
the expense of a subtle hardening of gender expectations for everyone.  
